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Professor Richard D. Pomp1 
Executive Summary 
 
This Report analyzes a 5% payroll tax that would be imposed on 
employers on the amount of the wages they paid to their employees. 
The anticipated response is that employers would shift this tax to their 
employees. This shift would occur by the employers reducing their 
employee wages by the cost of the tax. Each of the existing rates in the 
personal income tax would be reduced by 5 points, which would have 
the effect of eliminating the 3% and 5% brackets.. This reduction in 
rates would be limited to wages and not apply to other items of 
income, such as dividends, interest, capital gains, rents, royalties and 
the like. 
This reduction in rates should apply only if wages were reduced. 
Otherwise, employees would receive a windfall in having a tax 
reduction for no reason, and State revenue would be needlessly lost. 
Moreover, if employees were to receive the benefit of the tax 
reduction, little incentive would exist for them to support a reduction in 
their wages. A “tie-in” should be required; that is, the rate reduction 
should apply only if wages were reduced. 
The dilemma with a tie-in is that it might be difficult to determine 
whether wages have been reduced or not, and to what extent. Many 
ways exist for an employer to reduce wages and some of these may not 
be transparent. And while the payroll tax assumes its cost will be 
 
1 A curriculum vitae and short summary of my background are found at the end of 
the Report. Sebastian Iagrossi, a third-year student at UConn Law School, and the 
2019 winner of the Stanley R. Arnold Scholarship, awarded by the New England 
State and Local Tax Forum, provided invaluable research for this Report. 
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shifted to employees, it might be shifted backward to suppliers and 
independent contractors, or forward to customers.  
A tie-in imposes another administrative complexity because there 
would be one rate schedule for those whose wages were reduced and 
another for those whose wages were not. But the advantages of a tie-in 
are considerable and merit a detailed exploration. 
If the view is that employers are typically able to reduce their costs, and 
thus will be able to shift the payroll tax to employees, an explicit tie-in 
would be unnecessary. If the payroll tax is shifted to employees by 
reducing their wages, three consequences follow. First, an employee’s 
federal income taxes would be reduced because of the lowered wages. 
Second, reduced wages mean an employee would pay lower FICA taxes 
(Social Security and Medicare). Third, the employer would also pay less 
FICA taxes.  
Assuming wages would be reduced, then for most taxpayers the 
Connecticut and federal tax savings would more than offset the 
reduction in wages. Somewhat counter intuitively, these employees 
would have more take-home pay despite their wages being reduced. 
Less turns out to be more, at least in the short-term. But lower wages 
and hence lower FICA taxes will likely mean lower retirement income or 
lower Social Security benefits for many workers unless employers take 
actions to offset that reduction. Employers could use their FICA savings 
to subsidize this offset. In addition, disciplined employees could also 
invest their new tax savings for retirement. 
For low-income taxpayers, the reduction in their wages would be more 
than their tax savings. One way of addressing this problem is through a 
refundable tax credit. Refundable tax credits, however, raise the 
possibility of fraudulent returns. 
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Under the law, employers would not be able to reduce the wages of 
minimum wage employees. Consequently, one way of dealing with this 
issue is to exempt the wages paid to these employees from the payroll 
tax.  
Suppose contrary to the assumption above, wages could not be 
reduced. Then the payroll tax would become an explicit tax on 
employers and not an implicit tax on employees. These employers 
would be saddled with a new 5% cost of doing business. They would 
receive no reduction in their FICA taxes. Unless there were a tie-in, 
their employees would nonetheless receive the benefit of the rate 
reduction. Under this scenario of no wage reduction, the tax would be 
shifted from employees to employers. 
If the Legislature desires this shift in taxation, easier ways of achieving 
it exist, rather than in the guise of an ineffective payroll tax. 
A critical threshold question, therefore, is whether employers will be 
able to shift the payroll tax to employees by reducing their wages. If 
they cannot, there is no reason to adopt a payroll tax. Answering this 
critical question would be avoided if the payroll tax were elective, 
rather than mandatory. Then only employers confident that they could 
reduce wages would opt into the payroll tax; the others would simply 
not make the election. A tie-in would prevent employees of employers 
that did not opt in from receiving a windfall. 
New York has made its new payroll tax elective, and phases in its rates 
over three years. To date, only 0.1% of its employers have elected the 
tax. But New York’s payroll tax is dissimilar to the Connecticut proposal. 
And the participation rate may be a function of how the payroll tax was 




Nonprofits like hospitals, schools, the State, local governments and the 
like pay FICA taxes. If they can reduce their employee wages they will 
benefit from the lowered FICA taxes. 
The State is in a different position from all other employers, whether 
they are non-profits or not. The State would be both the taxpayer and 
the recipient of the tax. It would not have to shift the tax to its 
employees because the tax is not a cost—the tax is a wash. Yet if its 
employees received the benefits of the rate reduction without any 
reduction in their wages, they could be perceived as getting a raise. The 
issue is whether the State should somehow recapture some or all of 
those benefits. This problem would be avoided if there were a tie-in. 
A payroll tax cannot be imposed on the federal government without its 
permission, which is unlikely to be forthcoming. Similarly, a payroll tax 
cannot be imposed on an Indian tribe in its capacity as an employer on 
a reservation. Without a tie-in, the federal and tribal employees would 
be able to benefit from the state income tax rate reduction even 
though their wages had not been reduced. A tie-in would prevent this. 
Insurance companies are subject to retaliatory taxes, which are unique 
to that industry. It is uncertain whether the payroll tax will trigger 
retaliation. If retaliation results, Connecticut insurance companies will 
face increased costs in doing business in other states and be at a 
competitive disadvantage. 
Implementing a payroll tax represents a major change to Connecticut’s 
tax code, and the lack of a fully drafted bill hobbled what could be said 
in this Report with any certainty. There are many moving parts, many of 
which are interdependent. This Report identifies many of the questions 




I. My Assignment 
 
I have been asked by the Office of Policy and Management to prepare a 
report covering the following areas: 
a. Provide a high-level summary of who would benefit from a state 
payroll tax versus a state income tax for both itemizers and non-
itemizers at the federal level. 
b. Outline the major tenets of any other similar tax programs across 
the country. 
2. Internal Revenue Service2 
a. In crafting a payroll tax, what pitfalls do you foresee under which 
the Internal Revenue Service would prohibit a state payroll tax? 
b. If a payroll tax were instituted and later prohibited by the Internal 
Revenue Service, who would bear the enforcement consequences 
under such a scenario and what remedies would taxpayers or the state 
have? 
3. Federal Government/Tribal Nations 
 
2 The payroll tax may be the subject of future litigation between the federal 
government and Connecticut. My analysis of these issues in this Report would not 
be covered by any attorney-client privilege. Should there be litigation, discovery 
requests would likely extend to my work papers, drafts, and communications in 
preparing this Report. It is prudent that the State speaks with one voice in any 
potential litigation involving the characterization of the payroll tax. Consequently, 
my legal analysis of that issue should be deferred and take place in a manner 
where the attorney-client privilege applies. My caution should not be interpreted 
as my having reached a position or having even considered the merits of the 
questions posed—I have not. 
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a. Provide an opinion on the ability of the state to impose a payroll 
tax on the federal government and tribal nations. 
b. What legal arguments could the federal government or tribal 
nations make to avoid being subject to the tax? 
4. Credit to Other Jurisdictions 
a. Outline the tax consequences under the proposed payroll tax for 
individuals who work in other states yet reside in Connecticut. 
b. Outline the tax consequences under the proposed payroll tax for 
individuals who work in Connecticut yet reside in other states. 
5. Insurance Companies 
a. Would the imposition of a state payroll tax on insurance 
companies impact the retaliatory tax?  
6. Other legal/policy issues that arise in the course of the 
Commission’s deliberations 




The Legislature created a Payroll Commission (Commission)4 to study 
the viability of a payroll tax. Hopefully, this Report provides useful 
background information and analysis to help the Commission identify 
fundamental policy and design issues that need resolution. The 
Conclusion to the Report sets forth these issues in a systematic fashion.  
 
3 The one exception has been explained above. See id. 
4 Public Act 19-117; Section 385. 
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One of the threshold questions for the Commission is whether it would 
be more cautious to make the tax elective, at least in the short-term, 
which is what New York did. In April 2018, New York adopted an 
elective payroll tax, known as the Employer Compensation Expense 
Program (ECEP).5  
The ECEP is phased-in over a three-year period. The rates increase from 
1.5% of employee wages in 2019 to 5% in fiscal year 2021. New York 
estimates around 312 employers, approximately 0.1% of employers,6 
will have opted into the program by December 2019.7 Anecdotally, it is 
believed these are primarily small partnerships. Currently, none of the 
major employers, including New York State, has opted in. 
This Report labors under two major constraints. First, no fully fleshed 
out bill has been approved by the General Assembly’s Finance, Revenue 
and Bonding Committee, nor has either chamber of the General 
Assembly passed a bill. There is a bill, S. B. 1143,8 proposing a 5% 
payroll tax, but it was drafted as a “placeholder,” with many details 
missing.  
Implementing a payroll tax represents a major change to Connecticut’s 
tax code, and the lack of a fully drafted bill hobbles what can be said 
with any certainty. There are simply too many moving parts, many of 
which are interdependent. Many questions need to be answered and 
refined in order to adopt a fully functioning statute—or at least one 
 
5 Intentionally or not, New York was right in eliminating the term “payroll tax” 
from the name of its legislation. More about this in the Conclusion. 
6 https://www.wsj.com/articles/few-n-y-businesses-sign-up-for-state-program-to-
bypass-trump-tax-limits-1543766400. 
7 James Nani, NY's Payroll Tax Workaround Effort Draws 50 More Businesses, Law 
360, December 10, 2019. 
8 S.B. 1143, An Act Establishing a Payroll Tax. This bill seems loosely modeled after 
New York’s Employer Compensation Expense Program (ECEP). 
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that provides enough guidance to the Department of Revenue Services 
(“DRS”) for the drafting of regulations and other forms of guidance to 
taxpayers. The Commission confronts a formidable challenge. 
Second, a tax modeling consultant (“Consultant”) who can work with 
large data and who would have access to DRS data is necessary to 
provide critical quantitative analysis of a payroll tax under various 
assumptions and simulations. The data would be decisive in moving 
forward with the Commission’s deliberations but was not available at 
the time of this Report.9 
In preparing this Report, I have talked off the record with numerous 
experienced and sophisticated persons, in both the private and public 
sectors. The opinions below are obviously mine alone. 
III. The Concept of a Payroll Tax 
 
A. Policy Rationale 
 
The proposal10 calls for the imposition of a 5% payroll tax on wages paid 
by an employer to its employees for services provided in Connecticut 
 
9 The Connecticut School Finance Project (“Project”) has done remarkable 
simulations of a payroll tax, but has been limited by working with only publicly 
available data. The Project deserves much credit for identifying the areas that 
require more rarified and stratified data of the type to which the Consultant 
would have access.  
 As of December 2019, the Connecticut School Finance Project changed its 
name to The School and State Finance Project.  
In the interest of disclosure, the very able Director of the Project, Katie Roy, 
won the Morris Pomp Award at UConn Law School. I established this in memory 
of my father, and it is awarded to the graduate with the highest grade in his or 
her tax courses. 
10 “Proposal” refers to Senate Bill 1143 as interpreted by the DRS and the Office of 
Policy and Management. 
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(Connecticut wages).11 In exchange for this tax on the employer, the 
existing rates in the Connecticut personal income tax rate would each 
be reduced by 5 points.12 If that were all there was to the proposal, it 
would be nothing more than a proposal to shift the tax burden from 
individuals with Connecticut wages to their employers. If that were 
really the goal, there are simpler ways of achieving it. But it is 
reasonable to assume that few in the Legislature would endorse a tax 
on Connecticut wages, which might discourage employment in the 
State, even if the resulting revenue would be used to finance a 
reduction in the personal income tax on Connecticut wages. 
Instead, the anticipated response is that employers would shift the 
burden of the 5% payroll tax to their employees by reducing their 
Connecticut wages by the cost of the tax.13 Why would employees 
accept a reduction in their Connecticut wages? For reasons that will be 
 
11 A payroll tax might reinforce the current incentive for an employer to 
characterize service providers as independent contractors rather than employees. 
Employers have this incentive because of the savings that accrue from not having 
to include independent contractors in their pension plans and health insurance 
plans. Employers also do not have to pay FICA taxes for independent contractors. 
(For an explanation of FICA taxes, see infra Section III.I). The characterization of 
service providers has become especially relevant in the gig economy and 
California has recently adopted legislation governing the issue. See California 
Assembly Bill 5 (AB5). Proper worker classification is an active audit issue in 
Connecticut. 
 A payroll tax also reinforces the current incentive to pay workers “off the 
books.” The refundable low-income credit, see Section III.M, might encourage 
some workers to surface and be paid on the books.  
Whether a payroll tax would greatly aggravate either of these two pre-
existing problems is an unknown empirical question. 
12 Under one proposal, some of rates would be reduced by less than 5 points.  
13 The “cost” of the 5% payroll tax is not identical to 5%, but something less. See 
infra note 44. 
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explained below,14 employees would be better off, at least in the short-
term, with lowered wages and a rate reduction. This trade off would 
lead to higher take-home pay. That higher take-home pay results from 
reduced federal income taxes and reduced FICA taxes. Longer term 
effects may be more problematic for certain employees.15 
The rub is that employees would be better off with reduced wages only 
if they would not otherwise receive the benefits of the state income tax 
rate reductions. Put differently, the reduction in wages is the price paid 
for receiving the offsetting benefits of reducing rates. 
B. Who Should Benefit from Reducing Rates? 
 
One policy decision is whether the state income tax reduction should 
be eliminated across the board for all wages, regardless of whether the 
wages were reduced. The correct policy answer would seem to be to 
limit the benefit of a rate reduction only to employees whose wages 
were reduced because the employer shifted the payroll tax to them. 
Without this requirement of a tie-in, employees could be viewed as 
receiving a windfall: a reduction in their Connecticut personal income 
taxes without their wages being reduced. 
The challenge for the Commission is how to limit the benefits of a tax 
reduction to only wages that were reduced. In other words, how do we 
assure that the benefits of a reduction in the rates are tied-in to a 
reduction in wages? 
One difficulty is that many ways exist for an employer to reduce wages 
and some of these may not be transparent. A tie-in approach could be 
difficult to administer without some evidence from the employer or 
 
14 See infra Sections III.G, H. 
15 See infra Section V.3. 
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employees that wages were indeed reduced in one form or another. 
And could the DRS verify that evidence? Despite the administrative 
challenges, a tie-in eliminates many problems, some of which are 
discussed below, so it is worth considerable further analysis of this 
issue in collaboration with the DRS.16 
On the other hand, suppose the assumption is that employers are very 
able to reduce their costs in general—and will do so specifically in the 
case of the payroll tax. Under this assumption, wages will be reduced 
and thus there is no need for a tie-in. 
Certainly, the assumption that all wages subject to the payroll tax will 
be reduced simplifies the analysis because it means that the payroll tax 
is working as intended. If that assumption is challenged, however, and a 
tie-in proves unworkable, the next possible approach would be to 
extend the benefits of the tax reduction to all Connecticut wages that 
were subject to the payroll tax, whether they were reduced or not. This 
would require the employer to report an employee’s Connecticut 
wages and non-Connecticut wages to the DRS; the former would 
benefit from the tax reduction, the latter would not. If that proves to be 
too administratively onerous in the case of a multistate corporation, 
the benefits from income tax reduction could be extended to all wages, 
and not limited to only Connecticut wages.  
The latter approach eliminates a possible constitutional attack. If non-
Connecticut wages are treated more harshly than Connecticut wages by 
not receiving the benefits of a rate reduction, and there is no 
acceptable reason for doing that other than administrative 
 
16 See especially Section V.2. 
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convenience, a taxpayer could raise a constitutional argument that 
interstate commerce was being discriminated against.17  
A tie-in would help blunt this constitutional argument without the need 
to grant the benefits of a tax reduction to all Connecticut wages. With a 
tie-in, non-Connecticut wages would not be discriminated against 
based on their geographical status but rather because they were not 
reduced. This is one of the many cases in which a tie-in can play a 
significant role. 
If no tie-in exists, and if little revenue loss results between extending 
the rate reduction to all wages and extending it for only Connecticut 
wages, the more cautious approach would be to extend the benefits of 
a rate reduction to all wages.18 On the other hand, if extending these 
benefits to all wages meant a substantial revenue loss, the 
constitutional issue will need to be analyzed in depth. 
C. No Rate Reduction should be Extended to Non-Wage Income 
 
Unjustified by the logic of the payroll tax would be reducing the rate of 
tax on non-wages such as dividends, capital gains, interest, rent and the 
like. These items of income would not trigger the 5% payroll tax. These 
items could not be reduced by the employer, which would not have any 
control over them. Different ways exist for limiting the benefits of a 
rate reduction to only wages, and the DRS should be consulted to 
determine what is most feasible from its perspective. 
 
17 The Consultant could determine the revenue loss at stake between extending 
the elimination of the 5% rate to all wages and limiting it to just Connecticut 
wages.  
18 These wages would include services performed outside Connecticut. Those 




In determining the proper rate at which these non-wage items would 
be taxed, an individual’s total income should be considered. In other 
words, the rate should reflect an individual’s ability to pay, measured 
by her total income. For example, someone with high wages should be 
taxed on her non-wage income at a higher rate than someone with low 
wages.  
Connecticut uses this approach in determining the income tax payable 
by nonresidents. Although nonresidents are taxed on only income 
attributable to Connecticut, the rate at which that income is taxed is 
determined by their entire income, including income attributable to 
other states. This same sort of approach should be used in taxing non-
wage income. 
D. Should the Base of the Payroll Tax be Tied to the Existing 
Withholding Tax on Wages? 
 
Imposing the 5% rate on all wages rather than on just Connecticut 
wages would have an administrative advantage of tying the base of the 
payroll tax to the existing withholding tax on wages.19 That is, an easy 
administrative rule would be that any wages on which the employer 
already withholds the Connecticut personal income tax would be 
subject to the 5% payroll tax.  
Current law provides that anyone who maintains an office or transacts 
business in Connecticut and is considered an employer for federal 
withholding purposes must withhold the Connecticut income tax 
whether or not the payroll department is located in Connecticut. In 
general, all amounts that are wages and subject to federal withholding 
 
19 Although commonly referred to as the “withholding tax,” withholding is not a 
tax but rather a means of collecting a tax already owed by the recipient of the 
income that is being withheld upon. 
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are also wages for Connecticut income tax withholding purposes. These 
amounts include, but are not limited to, fringe benefits, supplemental 
compensation, golden parachutes, sick pay, moving expenses, 
restricted stock income, stock options, non-compete income, deferred 
compensation, and severance pay.20  
In the case of residents, withholding applies to all their wages, even if 
the resident works outside of Connecticut. Because withholding already 
exists in this situation, it is tempting to include wages for services 
performed outside Connecticut in the base of the payroll tax, especially 
if that would generate significant revenue. Administratively, that might 
seem attractive in the case of a Connecticut-based corporation with 
employees performing services in and outside the State. 
Administratively attractive or not, extending the reach of the payroll tax 
to out-of-state wages would be constitutionally suspect.21 
Unfortunately, if the tax were applied to only Connecticut wages, the 
 
20 Public Act 18-49, Sec. 20(2)(C) provides that for purposes of determining the 
compensation derived from or connected with sources within Connecticut, 
nonresident individuals shall include income from days worked outside 
Connecticut for their personal convenience and not for that of their Connecticut 
employer, if their state of domicile uses a similar test. Delaware, Nebraska, 
Pennsylvania, and most importantly New York, use a similar “convenience of the 
employer” test. 
21 Under the Commerce Clause, taxes have to be “fairly apportioned.” See 
Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274 (1977), Container Corp. of Am. 
v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159. This constitutional mandate applies even to a 
Connecticut-based corporation with a modest out-of-state presence. By analogy, 
a tax on all of the income of a Connecticut employer, regardless of where 
generated, would violate the fair apportionment requirement, making a tax on all 
of the payroll of a Connecticut employer equally suspect.  
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link between the payroll tax and withholding on Connecticut residents 
would be severed.22 
On the other hand, the link remains intact in the case of nonresidents. 
Wages of nonresidents are subject to Connecticut income tax 
withholding if the wages are paid for services rendered in Connecticut. 
Here it is more feasible and easier for both the DRS and employers to 
administer the payroll tax if it covers the wages of nonresidents who 
are subject to income tax withholding.  
For administrative convenience, a special rule applies that treats a 
nonresident employee who performs personal services for employment 
purposes in Connecticut for 15 days or less as not subject to 
Connecticut income taxation on those wages and consequently not 
subject to withholding.23 That rule could obviously be relaxed for the 
payroll tax but at the price of administrative complexity.  
The 15-day rule is just one of the special rules that limit the reach of the 
State’s personal taxing jurisdiction; other rules apply to limited 
situations.24 If these rules were to apply to the payroll tax so that some 
 
22 The Consultant could determine the extent of wages paid for services 
performed out-of-state.  
23 If a nonresident employee who was reasonably expected to work 15 or fewer 
days in Connecticut during a calendar year actually works more than 15 days in 
Connecticut during such year, the employer must withhold on all the 
compensation paid to that nonresident employee for services performed in 
Connecticut, including the compensation paid for the first 15 days. 
24 For example, compensation paid by interstate rail carriers, interstate motor 
carriers, and interstate motor private carriers to a nonresident employee who 
performs regularly assigned duties in two or more states including Connecticut is 
not subject to the State’s income tax and thus no withholding applies. 
Compensation paid by an interstate air carrier to a nonresident employee who 
performs regularly assigned duties on an aircraft in two or more states is 
considered to be income derived from sources in both the employee’s state of 
19 
 
Connecticut wages were outside the base of the tax, some revenue 
would be lost. The Consultant would need to determine the amount 
lost and whether the rules need to be relaxed or not, but any revenue 
gained would come at the price of increased administrative complexity. 
E. Expected Reduction in Wages 
 
Employers are expected to shift the cost of the payroll tax to employees 
by reducing their wages.25 In this manner, employers are held harmless 
from the payroll tax.26 Because this reduction in wages would implicitly 
be a proxy for employees paying a 5% personal income tax, the State 
would reduce existing rates by 5 points. Otherwise, the same wages 
 
residence and the state in which the employee earns more than 50% of the 
compensation. An employee is considered as earning more than 50% of the 
compensation in Connecticut if the scheduled flight time in Connecticut is more 
than 50% of the total scheduled flight time in the calendar year. Other special 
rules apply to seaman’s wages and military personnel. For a readable 
presentation of the extensive rules, upon which my description is based, see 
Connecticut Employer’s Tax Guide, https://portal.ct.gov/-
/media/DRS/Publications/pubsip/2019/IP-2019(1).pdf?la=en.  
25 This does not mean reducing wages by the full 5%. The cost of the payroll tax is 
not equal to the 5%. See infra note 44.  
The wages of an employee whose services would be performed entirely in 
Connecticut could be reduced starting at the time the payroll tax became 
effective. Employees who perform only some of their services in Connecticut in an 
unpredictable manner because of their travel schedules create a unique situation. 
It would only be after the fact that their Connecticut wages could be identified. In 
other words, they may have a fixed salary for the year regardless of where they 
work, but the services they perform in Connecticut may be variable and unknown 
ex ante. This problem is less severe if the time spent in Connecticut does not vary 
significantly from year-to-year.  
26 As will be discussed, the employer will actually come out ahead by at least 
saving the FICA taxes that would have otherwise been paid on the higher wages. 
See infra Section III.G. 
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would be taxed twice; first, implicitly as employers reduced wages to 
shift the payroll tax to the employee, and again, when those reduced 
wages became subject to the pre-existing income tax rates. 
To summarize, if the payroll tax works as intended, the State swaps a 
5% payroll tax for a reduction in rates, and employers pass the cost of 
the payroll tax onto employees through a concomitant wage reduction. 
Focusing only on the Connecticut personal income tax, an employee 
breaks even: the wage reduction would be offset by the income tax 
savings from reducing rates. Once the federal personal income tax and 
FICA taxes are taken into account, however, the employee comes out 
ahead, as does the employer. 
The rationale of the payroll tax assumes a tie-in. In sharp contrast, if 
employees were to benefit from the rate reduction without any 
reduction in wages, they would receive a windfall,27 and State revenue 
would be needlessly lost. 
If employers cannot shift the tax onto employees, the employers will 
bear the cost of the tax. Then the payroll tax would become an added 
cost for employers, and even worse, send the message that Connecticut 
is anti-jobs. If the payroll tax transmorphs from a proxy for an income 
tax, intended to fall on Connecticut employees through wage 
reductions, to a tax on the employer, what would the effect be on jobs? 
Would the tax constrain employment? Would employers pass the tax 
backward to vendors, suppliers, and independent contractors? Would 
employers pass the tax forward to consumers? Would Connecticut be 
seen as anti-jobs? Would the tax add to Connecticut’s reputation as a 
high tax state?  
 
27 See supra Section III.B. 
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With no tie-in, the benefit of a rate reduction would be bestowed on 
employees whose wages would not be reduced. Would that offset the 
above concerns and demonstrate that Connecticut was not anti-jobs? 
Would that tax cut encourage persons to seek employment in the 
State?28 These are critical but difficult empirical questions. 
It bears repeating that the belief that wages would be reduced to offset 
the cost of the payroll tax to employers is central to the rationale of the 
payroll tax. If that does not happen, the whole reason for having a 
payroll tax is undermined. 
F. The Payroll Tax as a Response to the Federal Cap on Itemized 
Deductions 
 
The initial impetus for the payroll tax was presumably the changes 
implemented by the so-called 2017 Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (“Act”).29 The 
Act imposed the now infamous $10,000 cap on the federal itemized 
deduction for state and local taxes under the Internal Revenue Code. 
The cap is scheduled to expire on December 31, 2025.  
The Connecticut School Finance Project (“Project”), known today as The 
School and State Finance Project, deserves the credit for proposing a 
payroll tax as one way of responding to the cap. 
 
28 For the reasons discussed in the text accompanying supra note 18, the benefits 
of eliminating the 5% rate probably cannot be limited to just those working in 
Connecticut without raising the possibility of a constitutional issue. Revenue 
considerations might require revisiting the constitutional issue in some depth. 
29 The Tax Cuts and Jobs Act was the original name of the bill. Because of a ruling 
by the Senate parliamentarian, the actual name is “An Act to provide for 
reconciliation pursuant to titles II and V of the concurrent resolution on the 
budget for fiscal year 2018.”  
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The State has challenged the legality of this cap in a case currently 
before the Second Circuit Court of Appeals.30 Even before the outcome 
of this litigation, the 2020 election may result in eliminating the cap, 
which the Democrats have made a priority.31 
Prior to the cap, taxpayers who itemized rather than taking the 
standard deduction on their federal income tax returns could deduct an 
unlimited amount of their state and local taxes, which in turn would 
reduce their federal income taxes.32 Connecticut has a disproportionate 
number of itemizers with large SALT deductions. The cap thus has had a 
substantial negative impact on Connecticut residents.33 DRS estimated 
that the cap would affect 170,000 residents by reducing their SALT 
itemized deduction by $10.3 billion, increasing their federal taxes by 
 
30 New York v. Mnuchin, ___F. Supp. 3d ___, 2019 WL 4805709 (S.D.N.Y. 2019), 
appeal docketed, No. 19-3962 (2d Cir. Nov. 26, 2019). 
31 Representatives Thomas Suozzi, D-N.Y, Bill Pascrell, D-N.J., and Mike Thompson, 
D-Calif., have recently proposed the “Restoring Tax Fairness for States and 
Localities Act.” This bill increases the cap to $20,000 for married taxpayers who 
file jointly in 2019, and phases it out over 2020 and 2021. The Bill would also raise 
the top rate of the federal personal income tax to 39.6%. The Bill was passed by 
the House on December 20, 2019 by a vote of 218-206. The President has 
threatened to veto the Bill in the unlikely event it passes the Senate. Brittany De 
Lea, Trump SALT Cap Veto Threat Doesn't Deter Democrats, Fox Business (Dec. 
20, 2019), https://www.foxbusiness.com/money/trump-veto-democrat-salt-cap-
bill. 
32 Because the starting point for determining the Connecticut income tax is 
federal adjusted gross income, the federal election to itemize rather than take the 
standard deduction, which reduces federal taxable income but not federal 
adjusted income, has no effect on a taxpayer’s Connecticut income taxes. 
33 The cap was just one part of sweeping changes made in 2017 and some 




$2.8 billion.34 If employers are able to shift the cost of the payroll tax to 
employees, with the concomitant reduction in their federal income and 
FICA taxes, the resulting tax savings will offset the effect of the cap. 
 
34 https://www.ctcpas.org/Content/Files/Pdfs/OLR2018Report.pdf. This is the 
most recent data available. The $2.8 billion figure comes from Steve Wamhoff et 
al., A Fair Way to Limit Tax Deductions, Institute on Taxation and Economic Policy 
(ITEP), (Nov. 14, 2018), https://itep.org/a-fair-way-to-limit-tax-deductions/. In the 
interest of disclosure, I am on the Board of ITEP and the former President. The 
Board does not approve any publications by the staff and those publications do 
not necessarily represent the views of the Board.  
About 8.4% of Connecticut taxpayers experienced a tax increase from the 
Act. Frank Sammartino, et al., The Effect of the TCJA Individual Income Tax 





 The payroll tax was one part of the State’s responses to the cap. Another 
response was a new entity-level income tax on most pass-through businesses. PA 
18-49, §§ 1-8. Connecticut was the first state to adopt this approach in 2018 and 
is still the only state where this approach is mandatory. This pass-through entity 
tax is levied at the top Connecticut personal income tax rate of 6.99% and offset 
by a State personal or corporation income tax credit for the entity’s members. 
Businesses can claim this tax as a deductible expense against their federal taxes 
and pass the benefit of the deduction to their members. The IRS has not opined 
on the legitimacy of the entity-level tax. 
 Another response was that the Legislature allowed municipalities to 
provide a property tax credit to eligible taxpayers who make voluntary payments 
to a municipally approved nonprofit that is organized exclusively to support 
municipal spending on programs and services (i.e., community supporting 
organizations). PA 18-49, § 10. The goal was to allow taxpayers who make these 
payments to claim a federal charitable contribution deduction for the donation to 
the nonprofit, in effect to substitute an uncapped charitable contribution for a 
capped property tax deduction. Perhaps unsurprisingly, the Internal Revenue 
Service has issued regulations to thwart this strategy. The State has challenged 
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The Act also increased the standard deduction, which is an alternative 
to the itemized deductions. This increase in the standard deduction 
resulted in fewer taxpayers being subject to the cap; the ones that 
continue to itemize tend to be higher-income individuals.35 
As will be seen shortly, any reduction in wages reduces federal taxes for 
both employees and employers independent of whether a cap exists or 
not.36 Because of these federal tax consequence, debate over a payroll 
tax should not be tied to that of the cap. Even if the cap were 
eliminated, the proposal for a payroll tax has merits on its own because 
of the reduction in federal taxes for both employees and employers. 
And despite the cap being scheduled to expire on December 31, 2025, 
no guarantees exist that this will happen. 
G. Employers’ Response to a Payroll Tax 
 
As already suggested, employers can respond to the payroll tax along a 
continuum marked by two polar points.  
The only response consistent with the rationale of the payroll tax would 
be for an employer to pass the cost of the tax onto employees by 
reducing their wages. If this occurs, the effect would be like that of a 
5% State income tax. In a sense, the payroll tax would function as a 
proxy for a State income tax by reducing wages, just like what an 
income tax would do, but in this case the reduction would occur 
through employers shifting the cost of the payroll tax onto employees.  
 
these regulations. State of New Jersey et al v. Mnuchin et al, No. 1:19-cv-06642 
(S.D.N.Y., filed July 17, 2019). 
35 No publicly available data exist on the effect the increased standard deduction 
had on reducing the number of itemizers in the State. The Consultant should be 
able to provide this data. 
36 See Section III.H. 
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In other words, the reduction in the after-tax amount of wages that 
would otherwise occur explicitly under the State’s existing income tax 
rates would now occur implicitly through a reduction in wages 
attributable to the payroll tax. The existing rates in the Connecticut 
personal income tax would each be reduced by five points to eliminate 
taxing these same wages a second time. 
For simplicity, assume a single individual with $10,000 of wages paid a 
5% tax --$500--on these wages, leaving the taxpayer with $9,500. After 
the adoption of a 5% payroll tax, these wages would be reduced by 
$500, to $9,500 and the 5% personal income on these wages would be 
eliminated. 
Assuming wages were reduced as in this example, three major 
consequences would follow. First, an employee’s federal income tax 
would be reduced. Second, reduced wages would mean lower FICA 
taxes (Social Security and Medicare taxes).37 Consequently, a payroll tax 
would increase an employee’s take-home pay at the expense of the 
federal fisc,38 which is part of its State charm. Somewhat counter-
intuitively, even though wages are reduced, the combination of State 
income tax savings and the federal income and FICA tax savings means 
the employee is actually better off and will end up with more take-
home pay. 
 
37 FICA taxes are described in detail in Section III.I. FICA is a tax based on wages 
and imposed on both employers and employees. FICA funds Social Security and 
Medicare benefits. Consequently, reducing FICA taxes is not an unmitigated 
benefit for employees because Social Security benefits are based in part on the 
aggregate amount of FICA taxes paid. (Medicare benefits are not based on 
wages.) Other contractual forms of retirement benefits are also based on wages.  
38 It might seem that employers would benefit from the reduction in wages, but 
that benefit would be offset by the payroll tax they would pay. See infra notes 53-
54 and accompanying text. 
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A third consequence is that an employer would also pay less FICA taxes 
because of the lower wages, and perhaps make less contributions to 
pension plans if these were based on wages. Reduced FICA taxes would 
be an advantage for the employer but not necessarily in the long-term 
for the employee,39 although some employers might want to use part 
of their FICA savings to offset the future loss in retirement benefits. 
These consequences occur if employers are able to reduce wages by 
the cost of the payroll tax. If, however, employers could not reduce 
wages, the payroll tax would become an explicit tax on employers and 
not an implicit tax on employees. No reduction in FICA taxes would 
result. Wage earners, however, would nonetheless benefit from the 
reduction in rates in the personal income tax, essentially receiving a 
windfall with the State needlessly giving up revenue.  
Put differently, if employers cannot reduce wages, they would be 
saddled with a new 5% tax. If there were no tie-in and the benefits of 
reducing rates were available whether wages were reduced or not,40 
employees would benefit, and employers would lose. The payroll tax 
would result in a major shift in the Connecticut income tax from 
employees to employers. 
H. Illustrative Examples 
 
1. Effect on an Employee 
 
To make the above discussion more concrete, consider a Connecticut 
employer having a resident employee. Assume the employee is single 
and has $80,000 of Connecticut adjusted gross income (AGI) attributed 
solely to Connecticut wages. The employee is currently subject to a 
 
39 See Section V.3.  
40 See Section III.B. 
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Connecticut income tax of $4,05041 and federal taxes (personal income 
tax plus FICA taxes) of $17,020.42 The employee takes home $58,930 
($80,000-$4,050-$17,020) after State and federal taxes. I will refer to 
this as the pre-payroll tax benchmark (“benchmark”). 
Assume a new 5% payroll tax were adopted and rates in the personal 
income tax were reduced by five points with no tie-in. Two opposite 
alternatives are possible.  
If the employer could not reduce Connecticut wages to offset the 
amount of the new tax, the payroll tax effectively becomes a new 5% 
tax on the payment of its Connecticut wages. The employer would pay 
a payroll tax of $4,000 (5% x $80,000). 
Without a tie-in, the employee would nonetheless receive the benefit 
of the rate reduction on Connecticut wages. The employee can be 
viewed as getting a windfall because she received a tax benefit and did 
not suffer any reduction in wages. The effect is that the 5% payroll tax 
on Connecticut wages, intended to substitute for the pre-existing 5% 
rate on those wages, simply becomes a tax on Connecticut employers 
and a tax reduction for Connecticut employees. 
The Connecticut employee would no longer pay the former State 
income tax of $4,050, which is assumed to have been eliminated. She 
 
41 See the 2018 Income Tax Tables accompanying the 2018 Form CT-1040 Booklet. 
The taxpayer’s effective tax rate is 5.0625% ($4,050/$80,000). I am using 2018 
rates to conform with the examples used by the Project. 
42 For the convenience of the reader, the calculations in this example are based on 
the Project’s excellent “FAQs: Proposal To Shift A Portion Of CT’s Income Tax To A 
Payroll Tax, July 30, 2019, p.2. The Project assumed the taxpayer claims the 
standard deduction and does not itemize, which is the only assumption it could 
make without access to actual returns. The Consultant should have access to 




would continue to pay the federal tax of $17,02043 and thus clears 
$62,980 ($80,000-$17,020). Her take-home pay increases by $4,050 
($62,980-$58,930), which is the amount of the State’s personal income 
tax that she no longer would have to pay even though her wages were 
not reduced. This is her optimal tax position: no State personal income 
tax and no reduction in her wages. None of the other alternatives 
below can provide a better tax result. This optimal tax position results 
because there was no tie-in. For example, with a tie-in, she would not 
get the benefit of eliminating the personal income tax and her take 
home pay would remain at $58,930. 
At the other extreme, assume the employer can reduce wages by the 
amount of the payroll tax. Whether there is a tie-in or not would now 
be irrelevant because in either event the employee would receive the 
benefit of the reduction in the State’s personal income tax.  
Assume the employer would reduce her Connecticut wages by 5% to 
$76,000 ($80,000-[5% x $80,000]).44 Eliminating the State’s personal 
 
43 Because of the assumption that the taxpayer claimed the standard deduction 
and did not itemize her state taxes, her federal income tax will remain the same 
regardless of the amount of her Connecticut income tax. 
44 The wages actually would have to be reduced to slightly less than $4,000. 
Wages have to be reduced to the point where the savings from the reduction in 
wages is equal to the 5% tax on the new, lowered wages. Under this assumption, 
the employer would reduce wages by $3,810 ($80,000/1.05) to $76,190. By 
reducing the wages to $76,190, the payroll tax on the employer would be $3,810 
(5% x $76,190), equal to the $3,810 the employer saved by reducing the wages to 
$76,190 ($80,000-$76,190 = $3,810). I have generally not incorporated this 
subtlety into the examples in the text in order to conform them to the Project’s 
examples, which ignore this complication. But see infra note 53 where this 
refinement is taken into account. 
 Employers using the payroll tax as a fig leaf to reduce wages by the greatest 
amount feasible might also conveniently ignore this subtlety. 
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income tax on her wages45 produces a savings of $4,050, the amount 
that was previously paid in Connecticut income tax. 
The payroll tax now functions as an implicit income tax because the 
employee has borne the full amount of the payroll tax, as if it were an 
income tax. Because her wages would have been reduced by only 
$4,000, and she would save $4,050 in State tax, she comes out ahead 
by $50.46  
I have purposely picked a situation where the savings in State taxes 
closely approximates the reduction in wages in order to isolate the 
Connecticut tax impact from the federal tax impact. Because the 
employee would break even at the State level, that is, the reduction in 
wages would be offset by the Connecticut personal income tax savings, 
any reduction in federal taxes would be a net benefit. 
That benefit can be calculated as follows. The employee’s $4,000 
reduction in wages would reduce her federal tax. The federal tax 
(income and FICA47) on the lower wages would be $15,834. The 
employee would now clear $60,166 ($76,000-$15,834). Her take-home 
pay would increase by $1,236 over the benchmark ($60,166-$58,930). 
 
45 There could be some State income tax depending on the new rate schedule 
accompanying the payroll tax. See infra note 70 and accompanying rate schedule. 
The Consultant should be in a position to simulate various Connecticut rate 
schedules that could apply in coordination with whatever level of payroll tax is 
eventually determined. 
46 I intentionally picked a scenario where the employee essentially breaks even. 
Working with DRS data, the Consultant would undoubtedly produce an exhaustive 
list of possible outcomes under various assumptions. Working with only publicly 
available data, the Project has also generated an illustrative chart of outcomes, 
assuming a flat payroll tax rate of 5% and a progressive rate schedule on wages 
ranging from .50% to 2.99%. See supra note 42 at p.3. 
47 The 2020 changes in FICA, see Section III.I are ignored in the calculations in the 
Report, which are all based on 2019 law. 
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Even though her wages are reduced, the tax savings would be in excess 
of that reduction and the taxpayer would come out ahead. But if 
measured against her take home if her wages were not reduced and 
there was no tie-in, she has $2,814 less in take home ($60,166-
$62,980). Without a tie-in, she would get the benefit of the reduction in 
State income taxes despite having no reduction in her wages. 
The following Table summarizes the above results.  
 
Predictably, the best tax position in the Table--$62,980--results from 
receiving the benefits of a reduction in the Connecticut income tax with 
no reduction in wages. However, if employers can reduce wages by the 
cost of the payroll tax, then the combination of the benefits from 
reducing the State income tax and the reduction in federal personal 
income taxes and FICA taxes, will increase the individual’s take home to 
$60,166, which is greater than the benchmark, but not in excess of the 
optimal take-home pay of $62,980. 
Note the importance of the tie-in if wages were not reduced. With a 
tie-in, an employee would receive no reduction in State income taxes 
and her take home would remain unchanged at $58,930. Without a tie-
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The Project has provided simulations for other taxpayers, all of which 
assume a reduction in salary of 5%. Whether there is a tie-in or not is 
irrelevant under that assumption and not analyzed by the Project. 
As another illustration, consider that before the adoption of a payroll 
tax, a married couple taking the standard deduction earning $200,000 
in Connecticut wages would pay $10,500 in Connecticut income taxes 
and $42,823 in federal taxes, clearing $146,677 ($200,000-$10,500-
$42,823). If their wages were reduced by the 5% payroll tax, their 
Connecticut AGI would be reduced to $190,000,48 and their federal 
taxes would be reduced to $40,278. For simplicity, assume they would 
pay no Connecticut income tax going forward on their reduced wages49 
because of the five-point reduction in the brackets. They would now 
clear $149,722 ($190,000-$40,278), for an increase in their take-home 
pay of $3,045 ($149,722-$146,677).50 The reduction in wages of 
$10,000 is more than offset by the $13,045 reduction in aggregate 
taxes. (A reduction of $10,500 in the State income tax, and a savings of 
$2,545 in the federal taxes,51 generates a total federal and State savings 
 
48 This assumes a 5% reduction in wages rather than a slightly less reduction. See 
supra note 44. 
49 This would depend on the any new personal income tax rate schedule that was 
adopted with the payroll tax. Under the rate schedule accompanying infra note 
70, they would be in the 1% bracket. 
50 I assume no Connecticut income tax post-payroll tax in order to maximize the 
amount of the increase in their tax-home pay. I do this in order to identify the 
amount that would be available to be shared with the State. The Project 
calculates the new Connecticut income tax using the rate structure put forth in 
the Act establishing the Commission. See infra note 70 and accompanying rate 
schedule. Also, the Project assumes wages are reduced by 5% whereas I would 




of $13,045.52 The savings are $3,045 greater than the reduction in 
wages ($13,045-$10,000=$3,045)). 
2. Effect on Employer 
 
Assuming the employer could reduce an employee’s Connecticut wages 
to offset the payroll tax, its state and federal corporate income taxes 
would remain the same. To illustrate, instead of deducting in the prior 
example $80,000 in wages prior to the payroll tax, it would continue to 
deduct that same total amount, but that would now consist of a 
combination of a deduction of wages of $76,19053 and a deduction for 
the payroll tax on those reduced wages of $3,81054 ($76,190+$3810 = 
$80,000). 
If the employer could not reduce the Connecticut wages and would 
have to absorb the payroll tax, it would bear a new 5% tax. This tax 
would be deductible as a cost of doing business, the same way wages 
or other costs of business are deductible. The payroll tax would reduce 
the employer’s taxable income under both the federal corporate 
income tax and the state’s corporate income tax.  
The employer would be subject to a federal corporate rate of 21% so 
that every $100 of deductible payroll tax would reduce its federal 
corporate income tax by $21. That reduction would mitigate the impact 
of the new payroll tax. The $100 payroll tax would have a net cost to 
the employer of $79 after considering the reduction in federal taxes. 
 
52 $10,500+$2,545=$13,045. 
53 For the purpose of this analysis, I have dropped the simplifying assumption that 
wages would be reduced by $4,000 to $76,000. See supra note 44. 
54 5% x $76,190=$3809.50 
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The deduction of the payroll tax would also reduce the State’s business 
tax liability,55 which is the greater of the net income base tax and the 
capital base tax. The capital base tax is calculated by levying a rate of 
0.31% to the apportioned capital base. The tax on the net income base 
is 7.5% of apportioned Connecticut net income, with a 10% surtax for 
corporations with total income of at least $100 million. Other nuances 
exist. The State’s corporate income tax is a function of how much 
income a corporation apportions to Connecticut. Various 
apportionment formulas are provided depending on the type of 
activities in which a corporation engages. These complexities defy 
straightforward modeling. Presumably, only a small number of 
corporations pay the bulk of the corporation business tax, and the 
Consultant should have access to their returns for precise calculations. 
I. Unbundling FICA taxes56 
 
The amount of the individual federal tax in the above examples consists 
of two different components, which for ease of presentation were 
bundled together and referred to simply as “federal taxes.” The first 
part is the amount of the federal personal income tax, which would be 
reported on Form 1040.  
Employers and employees, however, also pay taxes under the Federal 
Insurance Contributions Act (“FICA”). FICA taxes are composed of the 
old-age, survivors, and disability insurance taxes, commonly known as 
Social Security taxes, and the hospital insurance tax, commonly known 
 
55 This Report assumes the employer is taxable as a C Corporation. Pass-through 
entities would also be subject to the payroll tax, as would S Corporations. The 
Consultant would have the ability to sort through these distinctions. 





as the Medicare tax. Different rates and rules apply for these taxes. 
FICA taxes apply to wages, so the lower the wage, the lower the FICA 
tax. To the extent employers lower wages to pass through the cost of 
the payroll tax, both the employer’s and the employee’s FICA taxes will 
be reduced.  
The current tax rate for Social Security is 6.2% for the employer and 
6.2% for the employee. The current tax rate for Medicare is 1.45% for 
the employer and 1.45% for the employee, or 2.9% total. Consequently, 
the combined rate is 7.65% (6.2%+1.45%). 
The 2020 social security wage base is $137,700 (an increase of $4,800 
from $132,900 in 2019). This wage base is the maximum amount of 
wages that is subject to the tax for that year. 
The maximum social security tax employees and employers pay in 2020 
is $8,537.40 (6.2% X $137,700), an increase of $297.60 from the 
$8,239.80 maximum in 2019. Only the social security tax has a wage 
base limit ($137,700); the Medicare tax has none.  
Not only is the Medicare tax unlimited in amount, but also an additional 
0.9% applies to individuals with annual earned income of more than 
$200,000, and married couples filing jointly with such income of more 
than $250,000. Employers withhold this additional 0.9% Medicare tax. 
There is no employer match for this 0.9% additional Medicare Tax. The 
combined rate of social security tax and the Medicare Tax can exceed 
7.65%.57 
 
57 Connecticut also imposes a State unemployment tax only on employers. The tax 
is levied on the first $15,000 of an employee’s wages. The rate varies between 
1.9% and 6.8% based on the experience an employer has had with the 
unemployment of its employees. New employers, which have no experience, are 
subject to a rate of 3.4%. Because it is impossible to talk about this tax in the 
abstract, and given its relatively low amount, I have ignored it from all 
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The employer can deduct the FICA taxes that it collects on behalf of its 
employees’ wages as well as the FICA taxes it pays on its own behalf; 
these are part of its deductible business expenses. Employees cannot 
deduct the FICA taxes that their employer collects on their behalf nor 
can they deduct the FICA taxes that they pay on their own accord. 
In the example above of the single employee whose $80,000 of wages 
was reduced by $4,000, the employer and employee each saved 7.65% 
x $4,000, or $306 in FICA taxes. That savings was part of the reduction 
of federal taxes from $17,020 to $15,834; the rest was the reduction in 
the federal income tax. 
For businesses with large payrolls, the savings in FICA taxes can be 
significant. The Project created a representative model for Connecticut 
hospitals, which had 103,000 employees and a $7.6 billion payroll; 
which would have paid FICA taxes of $581,400,000.58 After the 
imposition of a 5% payroll tax and a concomitant reduction in wages, 
payroll would be reduced to $7.220 billion, reducing FICA taxes to 
$552,330,000 for a total savings in FICA taxes of $29,070,000 
($581,400,000-$552,330,000). The savings in salary would be 
$380,000,000 ($7.6 billion-$7.220 billion). The total savings in FICA 
taxes and salary would be $409,070,000 ($29,070,000+$380,000,000). 
After paying the payroll tax of $361,000,000, the hospitals would save 
$48,070,000. Of course, if the hospitals could not reduce their wages 
 
calculations, as has the Project. I have also ignored the federal unemployment 
tax, as has the Project, whose rate is 6.0%. That tax applies to the first $7,000 paid 
to each employee as wages during the year. In general, if wages were subject to 
the Connecticut unemployment tax, there would be a credit of up to 5.4% for that 
tax against the federal tax. 
58 See https://www.hartforbusiness.com/article/report-ct-hospitals-health-
systems-generate-27b-for-economy. That the hospitals may be non-profit does 
not excuse them from paying FICA taxes, any more than the State, municipalities, 
or school boards are excused from paying FICA taxes. 
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(or shift the payroll tax backward or forward), their costs would 
increase by $361,000,000, the full amount of the payroll tax. 
The discussion above focused on the fiscal impact of the FICA taxes on 
employers and employees. What follows is a summary of the fiscal 
impact on Connecticut and on the federal government. 
J. Effect on State and Federal Corporate Income Taxes from Reduced 
FICA Taxes 
 
An employer deducts the FICA taxes imposed on it and the FICA taxes it 
collects on behalf of employees. If wages were reduced and FICA taxes 
were concomitantly reduced, an employer’s federal and state 
corporate income tax would increase because a deduction that it 
previously had for FICA taxes would now be reduced. That in turn, 
would increase its taxable income. Nevertheless, the savings from 
paying less FICA taxes would outweigh the increase in the federal 
corporate income tax and the state corporate income tax so the net 
effect would be an overall reduction in federal and state corporate 
income taxes.  
To illustrate, assuming a federal corporate rate of 21%, every $1,000 
savings in FICA taxes would increase the federal tax by $210. The 
employer would have a net gain of $790 ($1,000-$210).59 From the 
federal government’s perspective, the increase in federal corporate 
income tax of $210 would help offset the $1,000 reduction in FICA 
taxes, which are paid into a trust fund, separate from the government’s 
general revenue. 
 
59 This is the same type of calculation for the payroll tax (or any deduction). 
37 
 
The State receives none of the FICA taxes, so the reduced payment 
does not affect its revenue. The State would, however, receive revenue 
from the new payroll tax. 
K. Effect on Connecticut and Federal Revenue from the Payroll Tax 
 
Whether wages are reduced or not, the payroll tax would be a new 
source of revenue for the State. It would also be deductible by 
employers, just like wages. But the State would come out ahead as 
illustrated below. 
If wages were not reduced, the payroll tax would become a net new 
business deduction. The federal corporate income tax would be 
reduced by the new deduction and not be offset by any revenue from 
the State’s payroll tax. For example, assuming a federal corporate rate 
of 21%, every $1,000 of deductions for the new Connecticut payroll tax 
would reduce the federal corporate income tax by $210. 
The Connecticut corporate income tax would also be reduced, which 
would offset the amount of revenue from the payroll tax. But overall, 
the State would come out ahead. To illustrate in the case of an 
intrastate corporation paying the corporate income tax at a 7.5% rate, a 
$1,000 payroll tax would reduce the State corporate income tax by $75 
($1,000 x 7.5%). The State comes out ahead by $925 ($1,000-$75). 
If the cost of the payroll tax is fully shifted to employees by reducing 
their wages, an employer would deduct the same amount as it 
previously did,60 which would have no effect on the federal or the State 
corporate income tax. 
 
60 See supra notes 53-54 and accompanying text. 
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The reduced wages would, however, would reduce the federal personal 
income tax and the FICA taxes paid by both the employee and the 
employer. The federal government comes out a loser. 
L. Minimum-Wage Earners 
 
The Legislature recently increased the minimum wage in Connecticut 
from its current level of $10.10 to $11.00 on October 1, 2019; to $12.00 
on September 1, 2020; to $13.00 on August 1, 2021; $14.00 on July 1, 
2022; and finally, to $15.00 on June 1, 2023. An employer cannot 
unilaterally change these amounts. Accordingly, employers would not 
be able to reduce wages below these amounts to offset the cost of a 
payroll tax. 
One way of dealing with this constraint would be to exempt the wages 
of minimum wage employees from the base of the payroll tax. 
Otherwise, the payroll tax would be a cost of doing business and reduce 
profits, increase the prices paid to customers, reduce payments to 
suppliers or independent contractors, or some combination thereof. In 
extreme cases, a low-profit business with a high number of minimum 
wage earners could otherwise pay more in the payroll tax than it has in 
profits.  
Minimum-wage earners are unlikely to be above whatever threshold 
for paying income taxes the Legislature chooses, so that the issue of a 
tie-in would be irrelevant. But they might be married and filing a joint 
return with a spouse and have income above the threshold. This 
introduces yet another complexity in designing the payroll tax.  
M. Low-Income Wage Earners 
 
For low-income persons, defined as those below the current 5% 
marginal tax bracket, their reduction in wages by the amount of the 
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payroll tax would not be offset by the aggregate federal and 
Connecticut tax savings that would result, and they would be worse off. 
For example, before the imposition of a payroll tax, a single individual 
with Connecticut AGI of $40,000 of Connecticut wages would pay a 
Connecticut income tax of 3.5%, or $1,395, and estimated federal taxes 
of $6,230. This individual would take home $32,375 ($40,000-$1,395-
$6,230=$32,375).  
Assuming after the adoption of a 5% payroll tax, her Connecticut wages 
would be reduced by $2,000 to $38,000,61 her State personal income 
tax would be eliminated, and her federal tax would be reduced to 
$5,837. Her new take home would be $32,163 ($38,000-$5,837), less 
than before the payroll tax was adopted. The reason why she is worse 
off is that her Connecticut income tax savings of $1,395 and her federal 
tax savings of $393 ($6,230-$5,837) combine for a total of only $1,788 
($1,395+$393), which is $212 less than the $2,000 reduction in wages.62 
Unlike higher-income taxpayers whose take home increases, hers 
decreases.  
A refundable tax credit would be one way of dealing with this 
situation.63 At the least, the credit would have to hold harmless every 
 
61 The actual reduction could be slightly less. See supra note 44. 
62 The numbers in the text come from the Project, supra note 42. The reduction in 
wages overstates the amount needed to hold the employer harmless. The 
reduction needed to do so would be $1,905. See supra note 44, but that would 
not change the essential fact that this individual would be worse off after a 
payroll tax without any concomitant relief. 
63 Because of the opportunities for fraud, refundable credits are controversial. 
The refundable Earned Income Tax Credit, which has complicated rules, has a high 
error rate, which some attribute to fraud, but others attribute to unintentional 
errors reflecting the difficulty of dealing with the complexity. See, e.g., Robert 
Greenstein, et al., Reducing Overpayments in the Earned Income Tax Credit, 
Center on Budget and Policy Priorities (Jan. 31, 2019), 
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individual below the current 5% bracket, so no one would be worse off 
after the adoption of the payroll tax, a reduction in wages, and a 
reduction in rates. The credit could be phased out at the point where 
the reduction in wages were equal to, or less than, the savings in state 
and federal taxes.64 Subject to revenue considerations, the credit could 
be even more generous than the hold-harmless amount and actually 
make everyone subject to the credit better off.65 
The preceding discussion assumed that the employer could reduce an 
employee’s wages. But if that did not occur, a refundable tax credit 
would be uncalled for. The State might wish to provide one for other 
reasons, but it would not be dictated by the rationale of the payroll tax. 
Without a tie-in, low-income employees would receive the benefit of a 
reduction in rates, even though their wages had not been reduced. No 
relief would be required. If a tie-in existed, however, employees would 
not receive any relief from the reduction in rates because they did not 
experience any reduction in their wages. They would remain in the 




earned-income-tax-credit; Joel Barker, et al., Billions Lost Yearly to Earned Income 
Tax Credit: Errors or Fraud?, 14 J. Bus. Econ. Res. 145 (2016), Lynnley Browning, 
I.R.S. Targets Hartford on Tax Credit, N.Y. Times (Oct. 24, 2004), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2004/10/24/nyregion/irs-targets-hartford-on-tax-
credit.html, What is the Earned Income Tax Credit?, Tax Policy Center, 
https://www.taxpolicycenter.org/briefing-book/what-earned-income-tax-credit. 
The DRS should be consulted on designing a refundable low-income credit. 
64 The Project estimates this would occur for a single person having Connecticut 
AGI of $50,000. See supra note 42 at p. 3. 
65 In theory, this would increase the incentive for fraud. See id. The Consultant 
could simulate various combinations of rates and credits. 
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N. A New Rate Schedule: Version One 
 
Current Connecticut Personal Income Tax Rates range from 3% to 
6.99% on Connecticut AGI. The proposed payroll tax rate is 5%. The goal 
is to substitute the proposed 5% payroll tax on employers paying 
Connecticut wages with a 5% reduction in the personal income tax. This 
would be accomplished by the employer shifting the payroll tax onto its 
employees by reducing their Connecticut wages by the cost of the 
payroll tax, and by the State reducing every existing bracket in the 
personal income tax by five points, which would eliminate the existing 
5% and 3% brackets.66  
For example, someone now subject to the highest marginal tax rate of 
6.99% (single filers with an AGI of $500,000) would become subject to a 
1.99% (6.99%-5%) rate. Each lower bracket until 5% would be similarly 
reduced by five points. The resulting brackets would be 0.5%, (5.5%-
5%), 1% (6%-5%), 1.5% (6.5%-5%), 1.9% (6.9%-5%), and 1.99% (6.99-
5%). The 5% and 3% brackets would be eliminated. Presumably, these 
lower rates would create favorable publicity for Connecticut. 
Two difficulties arise with this approach. First, the assumption in 
lowering these brackets is that wages were actually reduced by the 5% 
payroll tax. That reduction was equivalent to paying a 5% income tax. In 
other words, the schedule implicitly assumes a tie-in. This is a critical 
point discussed above.67 If Connecticut wages were not reduced, the 
new rates would provide a windfall. Once again, the importance of a 
tie-in is demonstrated to implementing the rationale of a payroll tax. 
 
66 Alternatively, the brackets above 5% could be left unadjusted so the first one 
would start at 5.5%.  
67 See Section III.B. 
42 
 
Second, with no tie-in, a potential constitutional issue of discriminating 
against interstate commerce exists. Any tax reduction limited to only 
Connecticut wages would be suspect, and might have to be extended to 
all wages, including those for services performed out-of-state, even if 
the payroll tax did not cover those.68 Any approach that taxed wages 
for services performed outside the state at a higher rate than 
Connecticut wages would be constitutionally suspect.  
If the revenue at stake between extending the new brackets to all 
wages and extending it to only Connecticut wages is not great, the 
more cautious approach is to let all wages benefit. Besides avoiding any 
administrative problems, the possible constitutional issue would be 
avoided. If, however, the revenue is substantial, the constitutional issue 
would justify a more thorough analysis. 
If a tie-in existed, there would now be a reason for not extending the 
benefits of a tax reduction to all wages. The reason would be that if 
wages were not reduced, the wage earner would not be entitled to the 
benefits of a tax reduction. Presumably, there would be Connecticut 
wages that were not reduced, and these would also not benefit from 
the rate reduction. Taxpayers with out of state wages that were not 
reduced could not argue that their treatment was based on geography. 
The disparate treatment would not be based on geography, but rather 
on whether wages had been reduced. The fact that there would be 
Connecticut wages not benefiting from the rate reduction in addition to 
out-of-state wages should provide a defense to a constitutional attack.  
 
68 See supra note 21 and accompanying text. 
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If the individual had non-wage income such as dividends, capital gains, 
interest, rents and the like, the policy underlying the payroll tax would 
not require these items should benefit from a rate reduction.69  
One lesson to draw from the preceding is that three rate schedules 
might co-exist: one for wage income that was reduced, one for wage 
income that was not reduced, and one for non-wage income. 
O. A New Rate Schedule: Version Two 
 
Because of Connecticut’s large per capita income, high-income 
individuals would save significant amounts of federal income tax and 
FICA taxes from a reduction in wages coupled with a State tax 
reduction. Even if there were no reduction in wages, they would still 
save from the lowered rates, assuming no tie-in.  
The bill passed by the General Assembly seeks to share in this savings 
by increasing the brackets in Version One above by one point, starting 
with the current 6.5% bracket, which would otherwise have been 
reduced to 1.5% (6.5%-5%). Accordingly, the 1.5% bracket would now 
become 2.5%, the 1.9% bracket (6.9%-5%) would become 2.9%, and the 
1.99% bracket (6.99%-5%) would become 2.99%.  
  
 
69 The issue is similar to the discussion about who should receive the benefits of 




The proposed rate schedule would be as follows:70 
 
 
AGI Single Filer 
 
AGI Joint Filers 










$0 $0 3.00% 5.00% 0.00% 
$10,000 $20,000 5.00% 5.00% 0.00% 
$50,000 $100,000 5.50% 5.00% 0.50% 
$100,000 $200,000 6.00% 5.00% 1.00% 
$200,000 $400,000 6.50% 5.00% 2.50% 
$250,000 $500,000 6.90% 5.00% 2.90% 
$500,000 $1,000,000 6.99% 5.00% 2.99% 
 
This rate schedule is teed off of the 5% rate. The Commission would 
have to decide whether to carry over the existing exemptions in the 
current rate schedule to this new one, and how to allocate any 
exemption, if at all, between income from wages and income from non-
wages. In addition, the Commission would have to decide how to apply 
the existing recapture rules. The Consultant should be able to calculate 
the revenue aspects of these decisions and how many residents at 
different income levels would owe how much income tax.71  
P. Commuters 
 
1. Connecticut Residents Commuting to other States 
 
Suppose a Connecticut resident commutes to New York and earns all of 
her income there. Under existing law, she would pay New York State 
 
70 The rates are set forth in P.A. 19-117, Sec. 385, the statute creating the 
Commission.  
71 The Project estimates that 2/3 of current Connecticut taxpayers would no 
longer owe any State income tax, supra note 42 at p.3.  
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income tax and receive a credit for that tax against the Connecticut 
income tax. Because New York’s rates are generally higher than 
Connecticut’s, it is likely that she would pay no Connecticut income tax 
because the credit for the higher New York income taxes would offset 
the lower Connecticut income taxes. The commuter would bear the 
higher rate of New York income taxes. No double taxation would result. 
If Connecticut adopts a payroll tax, and assuming it would not apply to 
her non-Connecticut wages,72 she would be in essentially the same 
position as before. Even if Connecticut were to apply the payroll tax to 
her wages and the employer reduced her wages accordingly, she would 
still bear no Connecticut income tax because the credit for the New 
York income tax would fully offset her Connecticut income tax, which 
would be lower than before because of the reduction in her wages. She 
will still continue to be taxed at the higher New York rate. 
Suppose the resident commutes to a state with a lower rate of income 
tax than Connecticut, e.g., New Hampshire, which does not tax wages. 
There would be no New Hampshire income tax to credit, and the 
resident would now bear the full amount of the Connecticut income tax 
whether her wages remained the same or were reduced. Conceptually, 
her situation would be the same after the adoption of a payroll tax as it 
was before. 
2. Resident of another State Commuting to Connecticut 
 
Suppose a New York resident commutes to Connecticut and earns all of 
her income here. New York would give the commuter a credit for the 
Connecticut personal income tax. Because the rate of the Connecticut 
income tax is generally less than that of New York, the commuter 
would pay the difference in rates to New York. The net effect is that the 
 
72 See supra note 22 and accompanying text. 
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commuter from New York would pay tax to both Connecticut and New 
York, at a combined rate that would be no higher than the New York 
rate. No double taxation would result. 
The commuter would be earning Connecticut wages, clearly subject to 
the payroll tax. Whether or not those wages were reduced by the cost 
of the payroll tax, and whether or not a tie-in existed, New York would 
presumably still credit the resulting Connecticut tax against her New 
York tax. Conceptually she is in the same situation both before and 
after the payroll tax in that her total rate of income tax will be set by 
New York. 
IV. Grand Summary: From the Weeds to the Forest 
 
Getting into the weeds of the payroll proposal is essential to 
understand its strengths and weaknesses but can be distracting from 
seeing the forest. The best way to summarize the above examples and 
discussion is as follows.  
Employers would have a new 5% payroll tax imposed on the payment 
of their Connecticut wages, the cost of which is assumed would be 
passed onto employees through a 5% reduction in their Connecticut 
wages. In Version One, existing brackets in the personal income tax 
would be reduced by five points—whether eliminated only if wages 
were reduced is a critical policy question. A refundable credit would 
hold harmless low-income persons below the 5% rate and thus 
preserve the progressivity in the existing personal income tax. In 




But there is more, which goes to the heart of the proposal. Many 
employees would have a reduction in their federal income taxes,73 and 
a reduction in their FICA taxes, both attributable to their reduced 
wages.74 This savings, combined with the reduction in the State income 
tax, would be greater than the reduction in their wages. Their take-
home pay would increase, despite the reduction in wages. And the 
higher the income, the greater these savings. 
Employers who were able to reduce wages would benefit from the 
reduced FICA taxes on those lower wages. The reduction in wages and 
the reduction in FICA taxes would more than offset the amount of the 
payroll tax they would pay. Some would have additional savings from 
reducing contributions to retirement plans that are tied to wages; 
others might use part of their FICA savings to offset the future 
reduction in retirement benefits of their employees.  
The new progressive income tax rate schedule for wages that has been 
proposed (Version Two) would share with the State some of the 
benefits accruing to higher-income individuals. 
Using recently released individual income tax data by the DRS for 
calendar year 2018, the Project has estimated the following major 
effects, based on Version Two and on the assumption that wages would 
be reduced by the amount of the payroll tax.75 They do not consider the 
federal or Connecticut corporate income taxes. The Project’s estimates 
follow: 
 
73 This reduction would be attributable to the reduced income tax on their now 
lower wages. 
74 Reduced FICA taxes and wages could reduce retirement benefits. See Section 
V.1. 
75 School and State Finance Project Financial Model dated Jan. 31, 2020. 
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An annual increase in Connecticut taxes would be approximately $586 
million, attributable to revenue from the payroll tax less the revenue 
lost from the States income tax reductions. This net revenue increase 
would be offset by the cost of the low-income taxpayer credit. 
Determining this cost requires access to taxpayer data that is not 
publicly available but could be determined by the Consultant.  
Annual savings to Connecticut businesses would be approximately $814 
million. This amount represents the savings from a 5% reduction in 
wages, plus the savings from reduced FICA taxes, less the amount paid 
in payroll taxes.  
Annual savings to individuals would be approximately $901 million. 
These savings come from reduced federal income taxes, reduced FICA 
taxes, and reduced Connecticut personal income taxes, less reductions 
in wages. 
The net loser is the federal government. It loses approximately $2.3 
billion annually, consisting of $1.5 billion of reduced federal income 
taxes and $800 million from reduced FICA taxes. 
The Consultant would have access to DRS data, which would allow it to 
refine the above estimates. 
V. Will an Employer be able to Reduce Wages to Offset the Cost of the 
new Payroll Tax? 
 
The key to implementing the rationale of the payroll tax is an 
employer’s ability to shift the tax to employees through a reduction in 
their wages. If wages were reduced by the cost of the payroll tax, 
employers would benefit by the reduced amount of the FICA taxes that 
they would pay on the lower wages (partially offset by an increase in 
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their federal and State income taxes from having a smaller deduction 
for their FICA taxes). 
Employees would also benefit. The tax savings, both federal and State, 
would offset, and in some cases considerably offset, the reduction in 
wages. But employees can be excused for suspecting something cannot 
be right about a proposition that seems so counter intuitive—being 
better off with lower wages. It will require careful explanation with 
easy to understand charts, graphics, and simulations. Because 
employers would save FICA taxes on the reduced wages, they would 
have a strong incentive to educate their employees that less is actually 
more. Employers would also have reduced contributions to retirement 
accounts, although some employers might choose to use part of their 
FICA savings to offset otherwise reduced pension benefits. 
If, however, wages cannot be reduced, employers would bear the full 
cost of the payroll tax and continue to pay the full amount of the 
existing FICA taxes. How employees would fare would depend on 
whether a tie-in existed. If wages were not reduced, and if no tie-in 
existed, lower-income taxpayers would receive a windfall from the 
refundable low-income credit, the premise of which is that they have 
borne the burden of the payroll tax. Other taxpayers would also receive 
a windfall. They would receive the benefit of the States income tax 
reductions without any concomitant reduction in their wages. They 
would have the best of all worlds. Their take-home pay would increase 
because of their Connecticut income tax savings and they would suffer 





1. Existing contracts controlling wages and wage increases. 
 
In the short-term, union contracts govern and control employee 
wages.76 Unless renegotiated, these contracts would prevent 
employers from offsetting the cost of a payroll tax through an 
immediate wage reduction. 
According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics,77 16.7% of employees 
(280,000) in Connecticut are union members and workers who report 
no union affiliation, but whose jobs are covered by a union or an 
employee association contract. Unions have traditionally exercised 
power in excess of what this number might suggest. Unless there were 
overwhelming support for a payroll tax among the rank and file, it is 
doubtful that these contracts could be renegotiated in the short-term.  
Alternatively, instead of an immediate reduction in negotiated wages, 
an employer might be able to recover the cost of a payroll tax by 
modifying future wage increases. Suppose in a pre-payroll tax world an 
employer planned on a 2% increase in wages going forward.78 This 
increase could be reduced in amount, in its timing, or both combined. 
There may be other benefits an employer was contemplating that 




77 The Bureau of Labor Statistics, https://www.bls.gov/regions/new-
england/news-
release/unionmembership_massachusettsandconnecticut.htm#umtable1.f.1. 
78 See supra note 42 at pp. 5-6. 
51 
 
There may be non-union, private sector contracts with employees that 
already guarantee annual increases. These would have to be 
renegotiated as well. 
The longer the period between the adoption of a payroll tax and its 
effective date, the more time employers would have to implement 
various strategies for adjusting wages. Otherwise, an employer would 
bear the cost of the tax and be unable in the short-term to pass it 
forward to employees. In addition, the 5% rate could be phased in over 
a period of years, which is what New York has done.  
2. The Special Case of the State as an Employer 
 
The State wears three hats. It is an employer and like any non-profit 
employer, it pays FICA taxes, which it has an incentive to reduce. If the 
payroll tax were imposed on it, another hat would be that of a 
taxpayer. The third hat would be that of the recipient of the payroll tax 
revenues. The second and third hats worn together mean that the tax is 
a wash and imposes no actual cost on the State that it has to shift onto 
its employees. This distinguishes it from all other employers, non-profit 
or otherwise, which have actual costs that they have to worry about 
reducing. One way of their doing so is by reducing wages. The State is 
under no similar pressure to do so. 
Suppose that the reduction in State income taxes is extended to all 
wage earners, whether their salaries are reduced or not; in other 
words, no tie-in exists. The State has no need to reduce employee 
wages by 5% because there is no cost imposed by the payroll tax that 
has to be shifted. Yet if the State does nothing, the effect would be that 
State employees would receive a raise equal to the personal income 
taxes they no longer have to pay. This result may present a political 
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problem if other taxpayers view the payroll tax as a disguised raise for 
State employees. 
With no tie-in, State employees would already be in the best tax 
position possible. They would have received an increase in their take 
home pay from the reduction in State income taxes, without any 
reduction in their wages. But without a reduction in their wages, the 
State will not receive the benefits of reducing its payroll, reducing its 
FICA taxes, (and perhaps making smaller contributions to pension 
plans). These savings would have otherwise helped pay for the loss in 
revenue from reducing the State income tax.  
From the perspective of State employees, they would be in the same 
position as employees of other employers that would be unable to 
reduce the wages of their employees and would have to absorb the 
payroll tax. Without a tie-in, those employees would also get the 
benefit of the reduction in State income taxes without any reduction in 
wages. Unlike all other employers, however, the State cannot convince 
its employees of the need to pass through the “cost” of the payroll tax 
because there would be no actual cost. 
The dilemma is whether State employees should receive a windfall like 
other employees of employers who cannot reduce wages (assuming no 
tie-in), or whether the State should make some kind of adjustment to 
recapture some or all of the benefits of the reduction in State income 
taxes, in other words, some kind of ad hoc tie-in. No doubt strong 
opposition to any recapture can be expected from employees and their 
unions. 
The real defect in this situation is that the benefit generated by 
reducing the State income tax is not tied to a reduction in wages. If 
there were a tie-in, State employees would be better off if the payroll 
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tax were paid by the State and their wages reduced, which could 
reduce their opposition. 
Assuming no tie-in, three major options exist. One, impose the payroll 
tax on the State, and attempt to reduce its employee wages 
accordingly, generating savings from the reduction in wages and in its 
FICA taxes. Without a tie-in, however, why would employees and their 
unions accept this? The employees are already in the optimal tax 
position: a reduction in State income taxes with no offsetting wage 
reduction. 
Two, do not impose the payroll tax on the State and let its employees 
benefit from the lack of a tie-in and the reduction in the State income 
tax. The difficulty would be the loss in revenue and the possible adverse 
public perception that State employees have been given a raise. 
Three, do not impose the payroll tax on the State and recapture some 
or all of the benefits from the rate reduction. In a sense, this would be 
tantamount to a full or partial tie-in and would presumably face strong 
union resistance. 
On the other hand, if a tie-in existed, employees would have two 
choices. First, they could support a payroll tax imposed on the State 
and accept a reduction in wages, and in return receive the benefits of 
the reduction in State income taxes, lowered FICA taxes, and lowered 
federal income taxes, leading to an increase in their take home pay. 
Their retirement benefits, however, might be reduced because of lower 
FICA taxes or reduced State contributions to their pensions, but the 
State could use part of its FICA savings to offset the reduced retirement 
benefits. 
Second, State employees could vote for the status quo: rejecting any 
benefit from reducing State income taxes and rejecting any reduction in 
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salary. The latter, of course, would leave them in the same position that 
they are in today.  
New York State did not opt into its elective payroll tax, but it gave no 
reasons for its decision. 
3. Employee Perceptions 
 
One of the biggest potential obstacles to support for a payroll tax, even 
with a tie-in, would be employee resistance. Employees are simply used 
to negotiating for pay increases, not accepting reductions. A tie-in 
would change that traditional thinking. The reduction in wages would 
be offset by the reduction in State income taxes, and when the federal 
income and FICA savings are taken into account, most employees 
would be better off, and their take-home pay would increase. 
Employees need to understand the underlying arithmetic and why they 
would come out ahead in take-home pay despite their wages being 
reduced—why less is more. Detailed spread sheets produced by the 
Consultant, based on information available from the DRS, and a full-
fledged public information campaign would be required as part of that 
educational process. 
Another potential obstacle is that employees’ Social Security benefits 
are tied to their earnings history. Lower wages can translate into lower 
benefits. Americans are notoriously poor savers,79 and many retire with 
 
79 "About half of households age 55 and older have no retirement savings (such as 
in a 401(k) plan or an IRA) . . . Social Security provides most of the income for 
about half of households age 65 or older." U.S. Gov't Accountability Office, GAO-
15-419, Retirement Security: Most Households Approaching Retirement Have Low 
Savings, p.2 (2015); “[A]ccording to a July 2019 ‘GoBankingRates.com’ survey, 
42% of Americans risk reaching retirement age, without having sufficient savings 
to see them through the rest of their lives. The same survey found that nearly half 
of Americans polled had less than $10,000 set aside for their later years. Rebecca 
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little other than Social Security.80 Employer pensions and contributions 
to deferred savings vehicles are also similarly tied to wages, which 
means that reduced wages today would translate into lower benefits 
tomorrow.  
To be sure, if the increased take-home pay were invested over a 
sufficiently long period of time, an employee might come out ahead 
upon retirement, but this calls for discipline, a degree of financial 
sophistication, and perhaps serendipity. But financial planners can be 
expected to participate in this potential new market by offering 
specially tailored savings options. Also, simulations by the Consultant 
could facilitate an employee’s decision making. 
Because of the FICA taxes they would save, employers would have 
strong incentives to help employees evaluate their options and 
encourage them to support a reduction in wages. And employers could 
 
Lake, 60 Years Old and No Retirement Savings, The Balance (Oct. 23, 2019), 
https://www.thebalance.com/retiring-without-savings-at-60-years-old-4161009. 
“As of 2013, the median retirement account balance among all households 55 to 
64 was only $14,500. Even after excluding all households that had saved nothing, 
the median account balance of near-retirement households was still only 
$104,000. If a household uses all of this money to purchase an annuity from a life 
insurance company that will pay a guaranteed monthly income for the rest of the 
household's life, this income will provide only approximately $5,000 per year in 
retirement-nowhere near what the household is likely to need." Keith Miller, et 




80. "Social Security is the most important source of income for seniors,” Monique 
Morrissey, The State of American Retirement: How 401(k)s have failed most 




use some of their FICA savings to offset the adverse impact on their 
employees’ retirement benefits.  
Even if take-home pay increases, other situations might exist in which 
reduced wages could have collateral effects. These could include 
applying for a loan or credit, negotiating alimony or child support, or 
negotiating debt repayments, and the like. Some of these situations 
may already focus on take-home pay; others may focus on gross salary. 
In some of these situations reduced wages might be favored by the 
employee; in other situations, increased take-home pay might be 
favored. Over time, the relevant decision-makers may come to focus on 
take-home pay rather than wages. 
Another collateral effect is that existing or potential employees of a 
multistate corporation might have difficulty understanding why two 
similarly classified jobs carry a different salary depending on whether 
they are in Connecticut or a neighboring state. Someone being 
recruited might not understand why the starting salary in a neighboring 
state is higher than the identical job in Connecticut. Again, this 
difference can be explained if given the chance. But a potential 
employee perusing the internet might dismiss the posted Connecticut 
job opening long before the difference can be unbundled. 
Large HR departments should be used to recruiting potential 
employees with spread sheets showing things like cost of living, taxes, 
crime, quality of schools, recreational activities, and everything else 
that may be of interest to a possible hire. The payroll tax and its effect 
on take-home pay would become just another line item in the 
presentation. 
Many corporations, and certainly the larger ones, use a well-known 
third party to manage their payroll function. That party can easily 
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provide spread sheets on the take-home pay on various salary levels in 
various states. 
4. Employer Perceptions 
 
Despite the name “payroll tax,” employers that can reduce wages to 
fully offset the cost of the tax could realize significant reductions in FICA 
taxes. For them, the so-called payroll tax is anything but a tax. Savings 
might also accrue from reduced contributions to deferred 
compensation arrangements, health plans, and the like, because these 
are usually tied to wages. Some employers, however, may hold 
employees harmless from these reduced contributions by using some 
of their FICA savings to maintain pre-payroll tax levels of contributions 
or by adjusting retirement benefits.  
VI. It is Uncertain Whether the Payroll Tax will Trigger the Retaliatory 
Tax Paid by Connecticut Insurers to other States in which they are 
Doing Business81 
 
The retaliatory tax is unique to the insurance industry. The primary goal 
of the retaliatory tax is to promote uniform and moderate rates of 
taxation of the insurance industry throughout the country. The 
retaliatory tax seeks to achieve a level playing field for out-of-state and 
domestic insurance companies. The retaliatory tax was based on a 
model statute promulgated by the insurance industry.82 
 
81 In the interests of disclosure, I represented American Fire and Casualty in its 
successful challenge to an aspect of New Jersey’s retaliatory statute. American 
Fire and Cas. Co. v. New Jersey Div. of Taxation, 189 N.J. 65 (2006). 
82 Western & Southern Life Ins. Co. v. State Bd. Of Equalization of California, 451 
U.S. 648, 669. 
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To illustrate the working of the retaliatory tax in a straightforward 
simple situation, assume that most states have a 2% premium tax, but 
State A has a 3% premium tax. Suppose an insurance company 
incorporated in State A does business in State B, which has a 2% 
premium tax. Because the premium tax in State A is one point higher 
than the premium tax in State B, the State A insurance company will be 
subject to a retaliatory tax of one point. That tax will be in addition to 
State B’s premium tax of 2%, bringing the total premium tax on the 
State A insurance company to 3%, rather than 2%.  
The expectation, well supported by experience, is that State A 
insurance companies will lobby their home state to lower their 
premium tax rates and thus reduce or eliminate the retaliatory taxes 
imposed by other states. When State A lowers its rate of premium tax, 
State A insurance companies will have their retaliatory taxes reduced 
elsewhere or perhaps eliminated, making them more competitive. And 
insurance companies from other states with say 3% premium taxes 
doing business in State A might now become subject for the first time 
to A’s retaliatory tax, causing them to lobby their home states to 
reduce their rates. The retaliatory tax is working as the industry and 
state legislatures intended when a rate cut in one state is matched with 
rate cuts around the country. This goal has been generally achieved. 
The retaliatory tax is blatantly discriminatory. Typically, there are three 
provisions of the U.S. Constitution under which a discriminatory 
provision would be challenged. The first is the Commerce Clause, which 
is inapplicable to the business of insurance because of the McCarran 
Ferguson Act.83 The second is the Privileges and Immunities Clause of 
Art. IV, §2, of the U.S. Constitution, which is inapplicable to 
corporations and thus has no application to retaliatory taxes. The final 
 
83 15 U.S.C.S. § 1011 et seq. 
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provision is the Equal Protection Clause, which requires only that the 
discrimination between foreign and domestic corporations bears a 
rational basis.  
In a case challenging California’s retaliatory tax, the Court broke the 
equal protection analysis into two parts: (1) Does the challenged 
legislation have a legitimate purpose, and (2) Was it reasonable for the 
lawmakers to believe that use of the challenged classification would 
promote that purpose?84  
The Court answered these questions in the affirmative and upheld the 
California retaliatory tax. “The legislative purpose of California’s 
retaliatory tax is not difficult to discern, for such taxes have been a 
common feature of insurance taxation for over a century. Although 
variously expressed, the principal purpose of retaliatory tax laws is to 
promote the interstate business of domestic insurers by deterring other 
States from enacting discriminatory or excessive taxes.”85  
The critical question is whether other states would interpret their 
retaliatory taxes as covering payroll taxes? Resolving this issue is critical 
to the industry. No other state has a mandatory payroll tax.86 If the 
Connecticut payroll tax is retaliated against, the cost of writing 
insurance in another state could increase, perhaps significantly. 
Connecticut insurance companies would not be competing on a level 
playing field in any state that retaliated for the payroll tax. 
 
84 Western & Southern, 451 U.S. at 668. 
85 Id. 
86 New York has an elective payroll tax. See supra note 5 and accompanying text. 
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To illustrate the issue, a sampling of some retaliatory statutes follows.87 
They have been paraphrased to be more readable and to cover the 
situation of a Connecticut insurer doing business in another state. 
• Wisconsin: If Connecticut requires Wisconsin domestics to pay 
taxes greater in the aggregate than Wisconsin charges 
Connecticut domestics, retaliation occurs. Taxes are defined as 
general purpose revenue taxes.88  
• New Jersey: Taxes, fees, penalties, licenses, deposit requirement 
or other obligations imposed by Connecticut upon New Jersey 
insurers which are in excess of such items imposed by New Jersey 
upon New Jersey insurers will result in retaliatory taxes.89  
• New York: If insurers domiciled in New York are required by 
Connecticut to pay taxes, fines, penalties, fees, or any other sum 
greater than those required of Connecticut insurers by New York, 
retaliation will occur.90  
• Arizona: If Connecticut premium or income or other taxes, or any 
fees, fines, penalties, licenses, deposit requirements or other 
material obligations are, in the aggregate, in excess of those 
Arizona applies to Connecticut insurers, a retaliatory amount is 
due. [Special carve outs apply to personal income taxes, property 
taxes, and special assessments.]91  
• California: If any taxes, licenses, and fees, in the aggregate 
imposed by Connecticut on California insurers, are in excess of the 
 
87 Research into the actual forms used by other states to calculate and collect the 
retaliatory tax was hampered because approximately 20% of the states require 
only on-line filing, and an account is necessary to access the retaliatory tax forms. 
88 WI. Stat. Sec. 76.66. 
89 N.J. Stat. 17B:23-5 (life insurers). 
90 N.Y. Ins. Law Section 1112. 
91 Ariz. Stat. Sec. 20-230. 
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amounts charged by California on Connecticut insurers a 
retaliatory tax shall be imposed [Special carve outs apply to 
property taxes.]92  
• Florida: If Connecticut charges taxes, license, and fees in the 
aggregate to Florida insurers that exceed those that Florida 
imposes on Connecticut insurers retaliation will occur. [Special 
carve outs apply to personal income taxes, sales or use taxes, and 
property taxes.]93  
• Pennsylvania: If Connecticut imposes taxes, fines, penalties, 
licenses, fees, etc. on Pennsylvania insurers that are higher in the 
aggregate than Pennsylvania would impose on Connecticut 
insurers retaliation will occur.94 
• Maine: If Connecticut imposes any taxes, licenses and other fees, 
in the aggregate, and any fines, penalties, deposit requirements 
or other material requirements, obligations, prohibitions or 
restrictions on Maine insurers that exceed what Maine would 
impose on Connecticut insurers the same taxes, licenses and 
 
92 Calif. Const. Art. XIII, Sec. 28(f)(3), I.C. Sec. 685. In Western & Southern, supra 
note 84, U.S. Supreme Court described retaliation as existing “when the insurer's 
State of incorporation imposes higher taxes on California insurers doing business 
in that State than California would otherwise impose on that State's insurers 
doing business in California. In computing the retaliatory tax owed by a given out-
of-state insurer, California subtracts the California taxes otherwise due from the 
total taxes that would be imposed on a hypothetical similar California company 
doing business in the out-of-state insurer's State of incorporation. If the other 
State's taxes on the hypothetical California insurer would be greater than 
California's taxes on the other State's insurer, a retaliatory tax in the amount of 
the difference is imposed. If the other State's taxes on the hypothetical California 
insurer would be less than or equal to California's taxes, however, California 
exacts no retaliatory tax from the other State's insurer.” 451 U.S. at 650. 
93 FL. Sec. 624.5091, Rule 12B-8.016. 
94 PA. Stat. 40-1-213; 40 P.S. Sec. 50. 
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other fees, in the aggregate, or fines, penalties or deposit 
requirements or other material requirements, obligations, 
prohibitions or restrictions of whatever kind shall be imposed 
upon Connecticut insurers. [Special carve outs apply to personal 
income taxes, and property taxes.]95  
Although these statutes are not identical, they follow the same general 
pattern. They ask whether Connecticut’s taxes on a foreign insurance 
company would exceed the foreign State’s taxes on a Connecticut 
insurance company doing business in that other State. If so, retaliation 
could be triggered. If Connecticut would impose a 5% payroll tax on 
out-of-state insurance companies doing business in the State, and the 
other State would not have a similar payroll tax, retaliation could occur.  
But apparently in some cases the instructions or forms for calculating 
the retaliatory tax cut back on the otherwise broad sweep of a state’s 
retaliatory statute. In other words, in some situations the statutes have 
more bark than bite. 
For example, the instructions for the Arizona tax provide that insurers 
from Connecticut are only required to use insurance tax rates, 
assessments for health insurance pools, and application and admission 
fees in calculating the retaliatory tax.96 The Arizona statute above, by 
contrast, refers more broadly to “taxes.” 
The California form for calculating the retaliatory tax uses only the tax 
rate on gross premiums plus any fire department tax, fire marshal tax, 
annual statement fee, certificate of authority fee, certification fee, 
 
95 Me. Stat. tit. 24-A, § 428. 
96 AZ Form E-RT and Arizona Retaliation Guide. 
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agent license fee, ocean marine tax, franchise tax, and municipal tax.97 
The statute is broader. 
Despite the broad Maine statute above, the form for calculating the 
retaliatory tax is limited to only the premium tax on different lines of 
insurance.98  
New Mexico provides an even more extreme example. Since 2009, the 
Commissioner of Insurance has exercised his discretion not to enforce 
the retaliatory tax.99  
The forms will sometimes reflect the difficulty of taking certain taxes 
into account in calculating the retaliatory tax even if the statute would 
allow it. Property taxes are a nice illustration. In recognition of the 
difficulty of including property taxes in the retaliatory calculation some 
statutes carve them out from inclusion. But even where no carve out 
occurs, as a matter of custom and tradition property taxes are often 
excluded anyway. 
Statutes, however, prevail over forms, which represent an executive 
agency’s views and not those of a legislature. A decision by a current 
administrator implemented through a form, which ignores the statute, 
can be changed by his or her successor. New Mexico ‘s administrative 
position of ignoring the State statute has already been criticized in a 
special audit conducted by the New Mexico Office of the 
Superintendent of Insurance.100  
 
97 CA Form CDI FS-002. 
98 ME Form INS-4. 
99 New Mexico Bulletin 2009-008. 
100 New Mexico Office of the Superintendent of Insurance, Special Audit of New 
Mexico Premium Tax Filings for the Period January 1, 2003 Through December 31, 
2016, p. 25. 
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The majority of states have retaliatory statutes that are not limited or 
narrowed by their forms or instructions. That leaves open the question 
of how a retaliatory statute referring to “taxes” would be interpreted in 
response to a payroll tax.  
Connecticut has a retaliatory tax similar to these other states. The 
Connecticut retaliatory tax compares “premium or income or other 
taxes or any fees, fines, penalties, licenses, deposit requirements or 
other obligations, prohibitions or restrictions” and retaliates if a 
Connecticut insurer pays in another state more than an insurer from 
that state would pay in Connecticut. A carve out is provided for 
property taxes and personal income taxes.101  
The question can be easily asked how Connecticut would apply its 
retaliatory tax if the State had not enacted a payroll tax, but another 
state had. Connecticut’s retaliatory tax is administered by the DRS and 
not by the insurance department, unlike some other states. The 
Commissioner of Taxation is an ex officio member of the Commission. 
The question can be easily asked of the Commissioner, but the answer 
will not necessarily have much probative value. Other states will not be 
bound by what Connecticut would or would not do. Because a payroll 
tax is unprecedented, the issue is one of first impression. 
Unfortunately, the Commission needs to resolve this issue laboring 
under incomplete information on retaliation.  
Three approaches are conceivable. The least feasible of the three is for 
the State to work through the National Association of Insurance 
Commissioners (NAIC) to determine whether there would be 
retaliation. The NAIC is the U.S. standard-setting and regulatory support 
organization created and governed by the chief insurance regulators 
 
101 Conn. Gen. Stat. § 12-211. The retaliatory tax form does not limit the statute. 
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from the 50 states, the District of Columbia and five U.S. territories. 
Through the NAIC, state insurance regulators establish standards and 
best practices. The NAIC, however, cannot legislate on behalf of a state; 
it has only a hortatory role. It also meets only three times a year. There 
would be no quick decision on the retaliation issue.  
The second approach would be for Connecticut to exempt all insurance 
companies, both domestic and foreign, from the payroll tax. This would 
avoid the retaliatory tax. Presumably, employee wages would not be 
reduced. If there were a tie-in, the employees would get no advantage 
from the elimination of the 5% bracket, and no reduction in their 
federal taxes. Similarly, the companies would get no reduction in the 
FICA taxes they pay, or any reduction in payments to savings vehicles or 
bonuses that are based on wages. If employees realized that they 
would be better off if their employers paid the payroll tax and reduced 
wages, they might lobby against an exemption for the companies. 
If there were no tie-in so that employees would receive the benefit of 
the elimination of the 5% rate, they would have no reason to oppose an 
exemption for the industry. They would be in an optimal tax position, 
receiving the benefits of the 5% bracket being eliminated with no 
reduction in their wages. 
The third approach would be for the State to impose the payroll tax on 
only domestic Connecticut insurers. No retaliation would result. If there 
were a tie-in, knowledgeable employees would support a reduction in 
their wages because that would reduce their federal income taxes and 
FICA taxes, and Connecticut income taxes from the elimination of the 
5% bracket. The companies would have the benefit of a reduction in 
the FICA taxes they pay, and a reduction in payments to savings 
vehicles or bonuses that are based on wages. With no tie-in, employees 
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would be expected to oppose any reduction in wages because they 
would already be in an optimal tax position. 
To be sure, while there would be no retaliation by other states under 
this third approach, domestic insurers would pay a payroll tax that their 
out-of-state competitors doing business in Connecticut would not pay. 
That would increase their cost of doing business. If they could pass the 
payroll tax onto their employees through a reduction in wages, they 
would reduce the FICA taxes they would otherwise pay. If they did 
reduce wages, their HR departments would have the same challenge 
that other employers would have in competing for out-of-state talent, 
convincing potential recruits that they will be better off with lower 
salaries but higher take-home pay.102  
After taking soundings from many connected with the industry, former 
regulators, and tax specialists, I conclude that it is uncertain whether 
the payroll tax will trigger retaliation as a practical matter. Certainly, 
the retaliatory statues have broad enough language to cover a payroll 
tax, but the question is whether as a practical matter they will be 
interpreted to do so. More investigation is called for before this 
uncertainty can be evaluated. 
One final note. If the payroll tax were elective, companies for whom the 
likelihood of retaliation would outweigh any savings in FICA taxes 
would presumably not opt in. The problem of retaliation would be 
eliminated. The question that would then arise is whether their 
employees would get the benefits of the 5% rate being eliminated. 
  
 
102 See Section V.3. 
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VII. A Payroll Tax Cannot be Imposed on the Federal Government 
Without its Permission 
 
The federal government and its instrumentalities are immune from 
state taxation. This hoary doctrine has its origins in the 1819 case of 
McCulloch v. Maryland.103  
That case involved a Maryland tax imposed on the Bank of the United 
States, incorporated by an Act of Congress. No similar tax was imposed 
on Maryland banks. 
Chief Justice John Marshall concluded that the Maryland tax was 
imposed on the operations of the Bank. Consequently, it was a “tax on 
the operation of an instrument employed by the Government of the 
Union to carry its powers into execution.”104 In hyperbolic dictum, the 
Court warned that the “power to tax involves the power to destroy.”105  
The Maryland tax was discriminatory because it applied only to the 
federal bank and not to state banks. The case suggests that a non-
discriminatory tax might have been upheld. The opinion “does not 
extend to . . . a tax imposed on the interest which the citizens of 
Maryland may hold in [the Bank], in common with other property of 
the same description throughout the State."106  
Unfortunately, McCulloch has not been limited to only discriminatory 
taxes. Today, McCulloch is interpreted to prohibit even 
nondiscriminatory state taxes on the federal government or its 
instrumentalities.  
 
103 McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316 (1819). 
104 Id. at 436-37. 
105 Id. at 431. 
106 Id. at 436. 
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The modern statement of the rule is set forth in United States v. New 
Mexico:107 “a State may not, consistent with the Supremacy Clause, U.S. 
Const., Art. VI, cl. 2, lay a tax ‘directly upon the United States.’108 While 
‘[one] could, and perhaps should, read M'Culloch . . . simply for the 
principle that the Constitution prohibits a State from taxing 
discriminatorily a federally established instrumentality,’109 the Court 
has never questioned the propriety of absolute federal immunity from 
state taxation. And after 160 years, the doctrine has gathered ‘a 
momentum of authority that reflects, if not a detailed exposition of 
considerations of policy demanded by our federal system, certainly a 
deep instinct that there are such considerations . . . .’110” Id. at 733-34. 
Indirect taxes on the federal government, however, are 
constitutional.111 The Court drew a line between taxes that fell within 
the general application of nondiscriminatory laws, such as a tax on a 
government vendor, and a “direct burden . . . upon the governmental 
instrumentality.”112 The Court stated that it was irrelevant whether the 
 
107 United States v. New Mexico, 455 U.S. 720 (1982). 
108 Mayo v. United States, 319 U.S. 441, 447 (1943). 
109 First Agricultural Bank v. State Tax Comm'n, 392 U.S. 339, 350 (1968) 
(dissenting opinion). 
110 City of Detroit v. Murray Corp., 355 U.S. 489, 503-504 (1958) (opinion of 
Frankfurter, J.). 
111 See, e.g., James v. Dravo Contracting Co., 302 U.S. 134 (1937), (holding that a 
gross receipts tax on a government contractor is constitutional even if the tax 
“may increase the cost to the government . . .”). Id. at 160. 
112 Id. at 150. See also Graves v. New York ex rel. O’Keefe, 306 U.S. 466 
(1939)(upholding a New York income tax on an employee of the Federal Home 
Owner’s Loan Association). 
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state income tax increased the cost of labor to the federal 
government.113 
The Court’s position is inconsistent with its willingness in other contexts 
to substitute economic pragmatism for formalism.114 It is hard to 
understand why certain nondiscriminatory taxes imposed on the 
federal government should not be acceptable, such as a property tax or 
a payroll tax. Nonetheless, a challenge to the Court’s doctrine that a tax 
imposed directly on the federal government is unconstitutional would 
be upheld by the lower courts and would require the U.S. Supreme 
Court to intervene. It is an avenue not worth pursuing. 
Although a payroll tax imposed on the federal government would be 
unconstitutional notwithstanding that it would be nondiscriminatory, 
the federal government would be free to waive its immunity and agree 
to opt into the payroll tax regime. If it were to opt in and reduce wages, 
the government would receive less federal income taxes and FICA 
taxes, but would save from the reduction in wages and come out 
ahead. However, because of civil service constraints and unions, wages 
are unlikely to be reduced.115 This would be especially true if there 
were no tie-in so that federal employees would already be in an 
optimal tax situation by receiving the benefits inuring from the 
elimination of the 5% bracket with no reduction in wages. From this 
perspective, federal employees would be in the same situation as 
 
113 See also the companion cases of Alabama v. King & Boozer, 314 U.S. 1 (1941); 
Curry v. United States, 314 U.S. 14 (1941), upholding sales and use taxes on 
government vendors that passed these taxes forward to the federal government. 
114 Complete Auto Transit v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274 (1977). 
115 The Project estimates that federal employees represent about 1.1% of all 
Connecticut employees. See supra note 42 at p. 11. The Consultant could 
estimate the wages of this group. 
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employees of a private-sector employer that paid the payroll tax but 
could not shift it onto employees through wage reductions. 
If the federal government did not agree to a payroll tax and if there 
were a tie-in, its employees would not have the benefit of the 
elimination of the 5% bracket.  
 
If there were no explicit tie-in, the State could consider other means of 
recapturing some or all of the benefits of the 5% bracket from federal 
employees. In effect, this would impose an ad hoc tie-in. The risk with 
an ad hoc tie-in is that federal employees could argue that they were 
unconstitutionally discriminated against. If revenue considerations 
justify it, the merits of this constitutional argument would need further 
analysis. 
If a tie-in were adopted across the board, covering all employees, and 
the federal government refused to waive its immunity, the 
constitutional argument would not arise 
VIII. A Payroll Tax Cannot be Imposed on an Indian Tribe in its 
Capacity as an Employer Without its Permission 
 
States do not have the power to levy a tax directly on a tribe’s activities 
on a reservation unless Congress or the tribe authorizes it. “[A]bsent 
cession of jurisdiction or other federal statutes permitting it . . . a state 
is without power to tax reservation lands and reservation Indians.”116 
 
116 Oklahoma Tax Commission v. Chickasaw Nation, 515 U.S. 450, 458 (1995) 
(quoting County of Yakima v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of Yakima Nation, 
502 U.S. 251, 258 (1992) (citation omitted)). 
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“In the special area of state taxation of Indian tribes . . . the [Court] has 
adopted a per se rule” against state jurisdiction.117  
Application of this per se or “categorical” rule depends on where the 
legal incidence of the state tax falls.118 Thus, “[t]he initial and frequently 
dispositive question in Indian tax cases . . . is who bears the legal 
incidence of the tax.”119  
According to the United States Supreme Court: 
“If the legal incidence of an excise tax rests on a tribe . . . inside Indian 
country, the tax cannot be enforced absent clear congressional 
authorization.”120 
The proposed payroll tax is levied on the employer. The legal incidence 
of the tax is on the employer. Unless a tribe or Congress authorizes the 
payroll tax, it cannot be imposed on a tribe in its capacity as employing 
persons, whether Indians or not, on a reservation. 
Furthermore, in the gaming context, the Tribal-State Compact between 
the Mohegan Tribe and the State of Connecticut provides that 
“Prohibition on taxation by the State. Nothing in this Compact shall be 
deemed to authorize the State to impose any tax, fee, charge or 
assessment upon the Tribe or any Tribal gaming operation except for 
charges expressly authorized pursuant to section 11 of this Compact." 
Id. Section 17(f). See also Proposal of the State of Connecticut for a 
Tribal-State Compact Between the Mashantucket Pequot Tribe, Section 
17(f). 
 
117 California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202, 215 n. 17 (1987). 
118 Oklahoma Tax Commission v. Chickasaw Nation, 515 U.S. at 458. 
119 Id. 
120 Id. at 459. 
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Like the federal government discussed above, a tribe can elect to waive 
its immunity and opt into the payroll tax regime. 
If no payroll tax is imposed on the tribe, their employees should not 
have the benefit of the elimination of the 5% bracket. An ad hoc tie-in 
could be adopted to deprive them of these benefits, as was discussed in 
the case of federal employees. The question is whether that would 
result in an unconstitutional discrimination against the tribe or its 
Indian employees. If revenue considerations make it worthwhile, that 
question would need to be pursued in greater depth. 
Just like in the case of the federal government, if a tie-in existed across 
the board, and a tribe refused to waive its immunity, the constitutional 
issue would not arise. 
IX. Should the Payroll Tax be Mandatory or Elective? 
 
If the tax is mandatory, the question becomes how many employers 
can shift the tax onto employees through reduced wages. If employers 
could not reduce wages, then for them the payroll tax becomes a new 
cost of doing business. For a labor-intensive, low-profit business, the 
tax could be excessive. Would this add to the image of the State as 
having a bad business climate, notwithstanding that Connecticut 
employees would benefit from the reduction in the State personal 
income tax if there were no tie-in? The question for economists is what 
effect would a tax on Connecticut wages paid by an employer that 
could not shift the tax to its employees, accompanied by a reduction in 
the Connecticut personal income tax, have on the State’s economy? As 
important as this question is, it may be essentially unknowable. 
If the tax is mandatory and the employer can shift it to employees 
through reduced wages, then the payroll tax will be working as 
intended. The 5% payroll tax on Connecticut wages would then have 
73 
 
the effect of substituting for a 5% tax on Connecticut wages. Both 
employers and employees would come out ahead. 
The ability to shift the tax onto employees could well change over time 
as labor conditions change. Both employers and employees would need 
assurance that the State would not adversely change key elements of 
the payroll tax going forward. The history in Connecticut with increases 
in rates once a tax is adopted does not necessarily offer this assurance. 
Nor does the recent experience with the reduction in the credit in the 
pass-through entity tax. 
If the tax is mandatory with some employers being able to reduce 
wages to shift the cost to employees, while others would be unable, the 
tax would be a hybrid: neither fish nor fowl.  
The Commission confronts a classic example of decision making in the 
light of uncertainty. Little experience exists for predicting how an 
employer would react to a 5% payroll tax. There is a worrisome 
downside in being wrong, with the payroll tax then becoming a tax on 
employers rather than a win-win proposition for employers and 
employees, with the federal government being the loser.121  
New York’s payroll tax is a cautionary tale. It is elective annually and 
phased-in over three years. The low participation rate, 0.1% of 
employers, is not encouraging. No major employer is participating, 
including the State itself. The New York legislation is dissimilar from 
what is being proposed in Connecticut so it is unclear what weight 
should be given to that State’s low participation rate. More needs to be 
learned about how New York rolled out its payroll tax and the public 
relations and public education that accompanied it. 
 
121 See supra note 75 and accompanying text. 
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An elective payroll tax would avoid it becoming a tax borne by the 
employer. Presumably, only those employers making the election 
would be confident that they could shift the cost to their employees. If 
that proved to be unrealistic, they would not have to continue the 
election. Conversely, employers that initially thought they could not 
shift the tax but later decided they could do so going forward, would 
subsequently make the election.  
Only employees of an employer making the election should qualify for 
the rate reduction in the personal income tax. In a sense, the election 
implicitly serves as a tie in. Employees of employers not making the 
election would have no claim on receiving a windfall by benefiting from 
the rate reduction in the States personal income tax. Presumably, 
employees should support, if not lobby, for an election by their 
employers as it would increase their take-home pay. 
After sufficient experience was gained with the tax, the participation 
rate could be evaluated, the revenue consequences determined, and 
administrative and policy dilemmas identified. The Legislature could 
then decide whether to make it permanent or continue the election. Of 
course, in the short-term the anticipated revenue for the State would 
have to be scaled back if it were elective unless the major employers in 
Connecticut chose to participate. 
X. Conclusion 
 
Many issues that need to be resolved were raised in both the text and 
in footnotes. The first part of this Conclusion gathers those issues with 
advice in some cases on the next steps to take. 
• The threshold question is how many employers will be able to 
shift the payroll tax onto their employees? One view is that most 
employers will be unable to shift the tax. In that case, it becomes 
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a new 5% tax on employment, coupled with a reduction in State 
income tax rates. This shift in tax from employees to employers 
should be debated explicitly and not implemented in the guise of 
an ineffective payroll tax.  
• The opposing view is that employers typically can reduce their 
costs of doing business. As evidence, economists note that wages 
have not increased as much as some thought they should have 
given the low rate of unemployment. Employers have reduced 
costs of health care by increasing co-pays on employee insurance 
plans and imposing other constraints on coverage. Those who 
subscribe to this view will have faith that the cost of the payroll 
tax will be passed onto employees. 
• Should the State provide a tie-in, that is, should the benefits of 
reducing State income tax rates be extended only to employees 
whose employers were able to reduce wages? This approach 
would minimize the State’s costs and provide a way of dealing 
with the knotty issues presented by State, federal, and tribal 
employees. But could a tie-in be administered? The DRS needs to 
be consulted on this issue. 
• Should the benefits of a reduction in the State personal income 
tax extend to all wages, only Connecticut wages, or only 
Connecticut wages that were reduced to accommodate the 
payroll tax? The correct policy answer would seem to be to limit 
these benefits to only those wages that were reduced because 
the employer shifted the payroll tax to the employee. This tie-in 
might be difficult to enforce without some attestation and proof 
from the employer or employees. The DRS should be consulted on 
how to audit this issue. The tie-in solves many knotty problems 
and deserves a thorough vetting. 
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• If a tie-in is not feasible, the next possible approach would be to 
grant the benefits from reducing the State income tax to only 
wages that were subject to the payroll tax, whether they were 
reduced or not. An employer paying Connecticut residents 
working outside the State would not have those wages taxed 
under the payroll tax. Yet if those residents cannot benefit from 
the reduction in State income taxes, the result could be that out-
of-state wages would be taxed at a higher rate than Connecticut 
wages in those instances where income tax rates outside of 
Connecticut are lower, such as New Hampshire. This raises a 
possible constitutional issue of discriminating against interstate 
commerce. If little revenue were lost from allowing all wages to 
benefit from the reduction in personal income taxes, that would 
be the cautious approach to take. If, however, the loss was 
significant, the constitutional issue would merit a deeper analysis. 
A tie-in would likely blunt this potential constitutional attack.. 
• Non-wage income such as dividends, capital gains, interest, rent 
and the like should not benefit from the reduction in tax rates. 
The existing rate schedule (or a new one) should be applied to 
non-wage income.  
• The possibility of three tax schedules exists; one for non-wage 
income, one for wages that were reduced by the amount of the 
payroll tax, and one for wages that were not reduced. Each 
schedule introduces an element of complexity. 
• In applying the existing rates on non-wage income, should the 
amount of an individual’s wages be considered? In other words, 
should persons with high wages pay at a higher rate on their non-
wage income than those with the same amount of non-wage 
income but having much lower wages?  
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• The refundable low-income tax credit raises the possibility of 
fraudulent returns. DRS needs to determine this risk and how to 
minimize it. 
• The possibility of retaliation by other states to Connecticut 
insurance companies in response to the payroll tax needs to be 
evaluated very carefully.  
• What is the revenue at stake from not being able to tax the 
employees of the federal government and of the Indian tribes?  
• There is nothing sacrosanct about the 5% rate of payroll tax 
despite it being identical to the rate of New York’s elective payroll 
tax. Hundreds of rates and rate schedules are possible, as are 
combinations of exemptions and recapture rules. All of this needs 
to be simulated. 
• Should the payroll tax should be elective or mandatory, and if 
elective should it be phased-in? An election helps sort out those 
employers that can reduce wages from all others. A phase-in 
allows the State to gain needed experience with the tax. 
 
• If elective, should the employees of an employer opting out 
nonetheless receive the benefits of the reduction in rates? A tie-in 
would automatically answer this question by denying the benefits 
to employees of employers that opted out. 
 
• The New York experience with its elective payroll tax needs to be 
thoroughly investigated. Why has there been such a low rate of 
participation? What can the Commission learn from the way New 
York rolled out that tax? What was the public outreach like? What 
kinds of public education and awareness took place? How 
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probative is New York’s experience? Not enough information is 
known about the New York experience at this time. 
 
• Another aspect of the New York approach needs to be explored in 
depth. New York grants a credit to the employee for the payroll 
tax paid by the employer. It does not reduce any of the rates in its 
personal income tax. The advantages and disadvantages of this 
approach need to be compared with our proposed payroll tax.  
 
• Hiring a consultant should be a priority to answer the above 
questions and those raised in PA 19-117, Sec. 385, establishing 
the Commission. 
If the Legislature decides to move forward with the payroll tax, it needs 
to control the narrative and should consider using a different name for 
the tax. To start with, the name “payroll tax” is inaccurate and has the 
wrong optics for an approach that is intended to reduce the State and 
federal taxes on both employers and employees. If it works as 
intended, with employers passing the tax onto employees through 
reduced wages, it is not a tax at all, but a way of increasing the take-
home pay of Connecticut employees by reducing their State and federal 
income tax and by reducing the FICA taxes paid by them and their 
employers. 
Notably, New York adopted a fairly clumsy name for its payroll tax, 
“Employer Compensation Expense Program. This name is both 
ambiguous and not very informative, but if anything, it sounds positive. 
Employers are not being taxed; they are being compensated for some 
unspecified “expense.” 
Adopting a new tax is always challenging. As those of us who worked on 
the original Connecticut income tax can attest, unanticipated issues will 
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always come up in the drafting. And that was true despite many other 
states having had long experience with an income tax upon which we 
could draw. In the case of a payroll tax, by contrast, Connecticut has 
only New York to look to, and its approach is different from what is 
being proposed here. 
The drafting challenges are daunting, but the Legislature is lucky to 
have superb and experienced personnel. The executive branch also has 
a wonderful resource in the DRS and the OPM. In addition, Connecticut 
is fortunate to have a very talented group of tax lawyers in the private 
sector, who have always given unselfishly of their time. Finally, the 
School and State Finance Project has spent more time working on a 
payroll tax than any other group. A joint venture among all of these 
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